 |
|
Jang Sung-mim
|
By Jang Sung-min
North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-gwan is in quite a fix. Indeed, his facial expressions betray his fretfulness. The countenance seen through media images is flushed, and his words have not been the polished language of a diplomat. His sensibilities are on display, unfiltered, as his each and every word concerning America is full of emotion. It is as if he is being chased by something, and cannot rid himself of the feeling of being driven to the edge of a cliff. This contrasts sharply with the diplomat of the past, the man who kept his smile without losing his cool no matter the seriousness of the crisis, the man who strode about in a carefree manner. Why could this be? It is because the North Korean hard-line faction within the military is putting pressure on him. The source of this pressure is bound to be the 24 million USD in North Korean money stored in Banco Delta Asia in Macao, now frozen by the U.S. It is understood that Kim Gye-gwan, as part of his government’s pro-negotiation faction, is being pressured to quickly recover "the people's money" from the "American imperialists," while withstanding political attacks from these hard liners. He is reported as having received severe pressure as follows: "How dare America seize the financial property amassed through the sweat and blood of the people? How can one negotiate with such a partner regarding the nuclear issue? It was a dubious proposition from the very beginning to negotiate with America regarding the nuclear issue, but if you are going to prove that these negotiations are not an utter failure, you must do whatever it takes to recover that money." Vice Minister Kim is said to be living in a "time of adversity," being sandwiched between the twofold pressures of the threat of "elimination from above and of defiance from below."Perhaps, then, this explains his recent tense appearance? During the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue of April 9 - 13, Kim Gye-gwan strongly expressed his will for dialogue with America from the very first day. As soon as he descended from the plane at Narita Airport, he proactively stated, "if America requests as such, I will not avoid a meeting with them." On April 8, he made an indirect request of our representatives that they serve as an intermediary with America. On April 10, after meeting with Vice Minister Kim, Chinese delegate Wu Dawei stated publicly, "North Korea has the will to meet with America." Furthermore, Vice Minister Kim showed more accessibility than was seen in the past, stating, "it would be nice to meet with America on this uncommon occasion." However, on April 11, the U.S. delegate to the dialogue, Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, stated flatly, "we do not have the intention of meeting with the North at this conference." His position was one of meeting with North Korea after they returned to the six-party talks. After all attempts at dialogue ended in failure, Vice Minister Kim Gye-gwan, his face as red as the azaleas of Mount Yak in Yangbyeon, stated the following: "I will return to the six-party talks the very instant that the money frozen at the Banco Delta Asia is placed in my hand. We publicly promised our will for nuclear relinquishment in the September 19 Joint Statement, but what happened next? The freezing of assets in Macao. The people's opposition arises from the fact that this was the end result of our negotiations. America places political, economic and military pressure on us, and pushes for nuclear disarmament. If this pressure continues, I will have to confront the American in charge." The "people" referred to here are of course no other than the empowered hardliners within the military. His displeasure was clearly revealed though the sequence of events in which he tried to sway the hardliners and went so far as to declare the will for nuclear disarmament, only for America to respond through financial sanctions, thus pushing him into an increasingly difficult political situation. Though having traveled far, he returned to North Korea unable to meet Hill even once. North Korea's four choices What plans could Vice Minister Kim be making, having returned to the North? The first is to search for a new method of approaching America. If America persists until the end in not withdrawing its requirement that the North must first return to the six-party talks, then the North will most likely take partial interest in Hill's statements that "upon returning to the six-party talks we are prepared to have bilateral talks with North Korea," and, "issues other than nuclear ones are open for discussion at the six-party talks." The North would thus be likely to probe just how much America is willing to compromise in the event that they did return to the six-party talks. If it were concluded that America would stick to hard-line policies, the North will maintain the "endurance" strategy of not rejoining the talks until America removes the financial sanctions. North Korean leader Kim Jong-il is said to have stated to Chinese Minister of State Tang Ja Sui upon his secret visit to North Korea at the end of last month that "the removal of sanctions is a condition for rejoining the talks." If this is indeed a factual account, then it is quite possible that North Korea has already chosen the "endurance" strategy. The second plan for the North is the hanging of hopes on China to fulfill the role of mediator. If China contributes to the resolution of the issue of financial sanctions, North Korea would afford more trust and discretionary power to them in the six-party talks. North Korea is already requesting China to serve as an intermediary in relation to the issue of money forgery. Although it was canceled, Chinese delegate Wu Dawei's planned trip to America on June 8 was part of a related effort. The third option is to increase exchange and cooperation with the South Korean government. Seizing the occasion of Former President Kim Dae-jung's visit, North Korea could attempt to reverse South Korean public opinion regarding America's financial sanctions. They may attempt to use this opportunity to push the nuclear issue above that of the money forgery issue in the national agenda. They may quibble that "it is America's fault that the nuclear issue is not resolved" while pointing to America's financial sanctions. After portraying America as a country uninterested in resolution of the nuclear issue, they will try to spark the increasing anti-American feelings in South Korea. They could use America's hard line policies towards the North as a lever in their relations with the South. The final and fourth option is, if despite all of these efforts Washington does not respond, to choose the extreme policy of once more escalating their nuclear ability. Vice Minister Kim Gye-gwan stated on May 13 that "it is not a bad thing if the six-party talks are delayed. During the interim, we can create a greater deterrent force." It was a tactic of placing counter-pressure on America by stirring a sense of emergency in South Korea, Japan and China. The next step is in building a consensus within America that the Bush Administration's policies towards North Korea are a failure, thus forcing America to drop its policy of making any further negotiations contingent upon the North first returning to the six-party talks. Of course, the possibility of "crossing the Rubicon River" through a nuclear test is not high, but it is certainly possible that the North will increase its deterrence force by refining more plutonium. In the case that America does not reply even to this, the probability is high that the next step would be to revive the long range missile program frozen in 1999. Roh's proposal for a South-North summit Kim Gye-gwan is in a delicate position. It is said that he was even criticized by the hardliners for "bandying about, enjoying all sorts of meals between various dinner conferences." It is not only Kim Gye-gwan, but also Kang Suk-choo, Vice Minister of the Foreign Ministry and others of the pro-negotiation faction whose position is weakened as America's period of non-response stretches onward. A corollary to the weakening of the North Korean pro-negotiation faction is the loss of influence held by the pro-negotiation faction in the U.S. It is unmistakable that Hill is in a state of distress. He was granted the greatest of flexibility from President Bush and Secretary of State Rice in the fourth round of the six-party talks, but, faced with the North's demand for a light water reactor as a precondition on the day after the September 19 Joint Statement, he was overpowered by the arguments of cynicism presented by the hard-line faction of his government. Hill's range of movement appears much more limited than in the past. It is said that, unlike the past, where he was completely focused on the nuclear issue, he is now devoting much more time to issues in other regions. The problem is, if America continues to tie Hill's hands, the channel of the six-party talks will be blocked and the set structure of conflict between America and North Korea will endure. If this is the case, it will become difficult for the pro-dialogue faction of North Korea to return to the six-party talks, and it will do nothing but contribute to the belief that the six-party talks are useless. With American and North Korean respective interests in dollar forgery and financial sanctions taking priority, criticism that the interests of the neighboring countries in resolving the nuclear issue are taking a backseat will clearly lead to critical public opinion in those countries. Thus, it is precisely at this point in time that President Roh Moo-hyun will, with public opinion as the wind at his back, take a firmer political stance that the drive for resolution of the nuclear issue cannot be abandoned because of America's financial sanctions against North Korea. The idea of a South-North Summit Conference presented by Roh on his visit to Mongolia was a dramatic reflection of this situation. The unpredictable results of Kim Dae-jung's visit to the North The first thing that America must understand is that merely deploying hard-line policies will not be adequate. The current situation on the Korean Peninsula has become much more complicated since the end of the Cold War, and South-North relations have become as tangled as the roots of a plant. U.S. Ambassador to Korea Alexander Vershbow's statement that "America's view of North Korea must change" after only a few days on the job suggested that he is beginning to understand South-North relations and the reality of the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, it is the American administration which must take note of the statement of its ambassador in Seoul. As the hardliners in Washington increasingly direct policy, the North Korean pro-negotiation faction is increasingly forced to search for an emergency exit, and to prepare an environment and foundation through which they can find a means of escape from the net that America has spread. That is exactly what the upcoming June visit of Kim Dae-jung represents. Former President Kim's visit could serve to be of great help to Vice Minister Kim Gye-gwan in his precarious position. Currently, it is the hardliners who hold the initiative in both Pyongyang and Washington. In order to give the pro-negotiation faction some oxygen, someone must provide them with a viable justification. North Korea will seek such a justification in the Former President's visit to North Korea. The meeting may also in effect provide viable justifications for action by the South, the U.S., and the other countries participating in the six-party talks. Striking developments may follow, depending on the circumstances. Alternatively, the door of possibility for a South-North summit conference may open in the South, and perhaps America will show a new resolve for compromise. If North Korea makes it clear that it will return to the six-party talks with only a small concession from America, this would further foster and concentrate public opinion in support of the cancellation of American sanctions. A summit conference between President Roh Moo-hyun and Chairman Kim Jong-il is a point of interest, but if, during former president Kim Dae-jung’s visit, Chairman Kim uses the opportunity to express his will to meet with President Bush, it could bring about an unpredictable and dramatic shift in the political landscape. Kim Gye-gwan and the North Korean moderate faction is greeting former president Kim's June visit as the ideal opportunity to regain their ground, as it may even perhaps provide a greater shift of momentum than former U.S. president Jimmy Carter's 1994 visit. This is why former president Kim's visit is no less than a "life raft" to the moderate faction of North Korea. Jang Sung-min is president of the World and Northeast Asia Peace Forum and presenter of a current affairs radio program for the PBC. He served as a Member of the National Assembly's Unification, Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee. He is also the author of "The Bush Administration's Policy toward the Korean Peninsula After 9/11."
