Posted on : Oct.20,2006 14:27 KST
Kim Jong-Cheol, Editorial Writer
North Korea says it is the U.S. threat that prompted it to develop its long-range missiles and nuclear weapons. However, North Korea knows quite well that the United States could not very easily attack it even if it wanted to, because the international political scene surrounding the Korean peninsula would not permit such a full-scale assault. The U.S. by far had the strongest military during the Korean War, as well, but - against the wishes of the South Korean government of Syngman Rhee - the U.S. nevertheless stopped its forces near the 38th parallel. At that time, the U.S. thought that removing North Korea once and for all would be impossible unless it dared to confront China head-on. Nothing about the political makeup of the region has changed today.
It became clear long ago that a so-called "preemptive precision strike" by the U.S. on a specific target is not very likely. During the "first nuclear crisis" of 1993, the Clinton administration determined that the damage incurred by the armed clash that would result when Pyongyang retaliated just would not be worth it, and so gave up on those plans. The situation remains the same today. Besides, it is the North’s development of nuclear bombs that would be the excuse for such an attack in the first place.
Pyongyang’s claim that the nuclear test is for "superstrong sovereign defense" (KCNA report, Oct. 9) and a "proactive defensive measure in response to the increasing U.S. threat of nuclear war" (NK foreign ministry spokesman, Oct. 17) therefore makes no sense if you look at the matter carefully. Which is not to say there has never been a U.S. threat placed against the North: prior to 1991, the U.S. had tactical nuclear weapons on the peninsula. But that, too, is no good reason to develop nuclear weapons.
Ironically, what seriously threatens the North right now is its own nuclear ambitions. It is more than a military threat, too. Once the U.N. implements economic sanctions and Chinese and South Korean aid in its various forms gets cut off or reduced, it is highly likely there could be internal unrest in the North.
Pyongyang’s belief that the U.S. will negotiate with it to prevent proliferation will not work, at least with the Bush administration. Bush has continually refused to hold bilateral talks with the North, and at the six-party talks, put together after great effort on the part of China and South Korea, it has always made it clear it will not engage the North in any give-and-take. Furthermore, in some ways the U.S. has either stood by and watched or encouraged the situation, so as to have the North Korean nuclear issue justify their missile defense (MD) plans, which face much opposition both in the U.S. and internationally.
The North’s actions have come in stages. First, it withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. Then, it declared it had nuclear weapons in February 2005. Now, in October 2006, it tests a nuclear explosive device. All these moves were intended to increase pressure on the U.S. During this process, it nearly pleaded with the U.S., "Please hold us back so we don’t go ahead with this." In fact, it was the first newly nuclear state to have issued a forewarning that it was going to test a bomb.
Another test is very likely, given the value Pyongyang places on maintaining face. If that doesn’t get the U.S.’s attention, maybe the next card it plays will be attempting to export the bomb. It is recklessly gambling with the destiny of the Korean people. Not that it will get the Bush administration to negotiate. The U.S. administration does not consider a few nukes and crude long-range missiles a direct threat. Instead, U.S. neocons think the opportunity for regime change in North Korea has come, and they are tightening the noose with sanctions, trying to tightly grab Pyongyang by the neck.
One finds solutions when one changes both one’s thinking and approach. Instead of placing all of its bets with the U.S., which is not responding, the North should try China and South Korea. The North has much more to gain from neighboring countries than it does from the distant U.S. These countries are ready to embrace the North if it changes. And if it does so on its own, working out relations with Japan would also be easy. The U.S. would have to come to the table at that point, whether it wanted to or not. The North giving up on its nukes would be the way to build confidence with Seoul and Beijing. The road ahead could be a long one. But if the North wants to take that route, it must - at the very least - refrain from any further tests. This restraint would be the beginning of a solution.
