[Column] The limitations placed on the six-party talks

By Lee Jong-seok, Senior Fellow at the Sejong Institute and Former Minister of Unification

The six-party talks have begun again. Since the talks held in December of last year were mostly about different sides feeling each other out, these become the first substantial talks since the joint statement signed in Beijing on September 19, 2005. Considering how North Korea has engaged in its first nuclear test, you might say these current talks are just about the last crossroads between ruin and a peaceful resolution.

We are returning to the six-party talks after having synthesized a methodology for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in the joint statement of September 19, only to have things go in reverse when the talks were held back by the question of financial measures. We return to the negotiation table only after paying a high price for this delay - a high price in the form of North Korea’s nuclear test. It does look like there will be some degree of progress at these talks, given the optimistic comments coming of late from related officials in Washington and Pyongyang. This is most fortunate. However, I believe there are several strategic considerations that must be addressed if the current discussion is going to contribute to a fundamental resolution instead of a quick-fix glossing over of the matter at hand.

First of all, there needs to be bold give-and-take. North Korea needs to abandon its nuclear program once and for all, and in response, the United States and the other countries party to the process need to assure the North that its system is safe from threat and offer an economic aid package. We will get nowhere if things continue as they have, where the North and the United States wrangle over every last petty issue as if neither could care less about the ultimate goal of abolishing Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Moreover, the principle of "action for action" must be maintained; the issue is not going to be resolved with one-sided demands that the other side surrender everything first.

Secondly, there needs to be phased agreement with the guarantee of continuity. Agreeing on everything at the current talks would be nice, but realistically speaking it would be hard for that to happen. Inevitably the next best approach is going to be agreement that involves give-and-take in stages. That being the case, it must be fully assured that the phases lead to final results.

Thirdly and finally, choices and focus must be strategic in nature. North Korean human rights are important and financial sanctions are important, but however important they may be we are at a fork in the road. One way leads to peace for the Korean peninsula, and the other leads to tragic dispute. No issue is as pressing as the North Korean nuclear issue when nuclear proliferation stands as a serious threat to the peace of all humanity. The approach we need to take, then, is that the nuclear issue gets first priority and the most attention over all other issues relating to North Korea.

These suggestions, along with the need for direct talks between Pyongyang and Washington, are actually what the Korea government has consistently recommended to the U.S. government. Though it is something like making up for missing a good chance, it looks like the U.S. is stepping closer to these suggestions only after paying a high price in the form of Pyongyang’s test of a nuclear device.

The U.S. must stop avoiding direct talks with Pyongyang, and treating them as if to merely allow bilateral talks is a form of "reward." It must remember that bilateral discussion is the basic format for conflict resolution. The U.S. must also change the narrow-minded approach that seeks to divide the nations party to the process into factions of "us" versus "them." It must stop acting as if it is unacceptable for one among the nations to be a "mediator," while in the meantime it finds no fault with anothor being a "facilitator."

North Korea, in turn, needs to quit with its old behavior if it has any intention of giving up its nuclear program through negotiation. It may think the brinkmanship and threat diplomacy had the desired effect because of its nuclear test, but if you consider the negative image and low level of confidence that this act earned within the international community, the only thing the North managed to do was show off. In fact, the security guarantee and economic aide the North would receive if it gives up its nuclear program would be the same as it would have been prior to its nuclear test, so the North’s practical interests were to be found all along in accepting China’s and South Korea’s call to return to the talks, not in testing a nuclear device.

In the meantime, the South Korean government needs to seek a full restoration of inter-Korean relations without delay, once there has been a certain amount of progress achieved at the six-party talks. There will be limits to how the situation can be turned around in inter-Korean relations given the extreme context of the North’s nuclear test, but the current status of relations is something that is both exceptional and temporary. Basically, when progress in both the nuclear issue and in inter-Korean relations start to influence each other in a positive way, the political situation on the peninsula will be stabilized and South Korea’s diplomatic capabilities will take a big leap forward. The fact that progress on the nuclear issue can come through good relations between North and South Korea was amply proven in the way the joint statement came from the six-party talks in Beijing in September 2005.

We have a major task before us, one that goes beyond the nuclear issue; namely, ending the Cold War on the Korean peninsula and achieving peaceful reunification. Progress in inter-Korean relations will be essential for realizing this goal, a goal for which other nations, to a lesser degree, might sense the need. Only with progress in relations with the North will be we able to respond proactively and with initiative to the unpredictable political situation on the peninsula that will result from the changes quietly underway in North Korea, well hidden behind the commotion of the nuclear issue.

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