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South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un stand in the background while South Korean Minister of National Defense Song Young-moo and North Korean Minister of the People‘s Armed Forces No Kwang-chol stand before reporters after signing the Comprehensive Military Agreement on Sept. 19. (photo pool)
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Group of reserve generals release statement saying CMA threatens national security
A fierce debate is underway about the Comprehensive Military Agreement (CMA), which was reached by South and North Korea on Sept. 19. Initially, opposition to the agreement was led by several conservative newspapers who took issue with it, but now former members of the military have come forward to actively side with the opponents to the agreement. Not long ago, a group of generals in the reserves who say they are worried about national security, including former defense ministers, organized a debate and released a statement to the nation in which they voiced their opposition to the agreement. Their argument basically boils down to the claim that the CMA endangers national security by tying the hands of the South Korean military. Opponents allege that the establishment of a buffer zone in the West (Yellow) Sea has neutralized the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and isolated the five islands in the West Sea and that the declaration of a no-fly zone has weakened the air force’s ability to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance. But these opponents attribute little significance to the fact that the CMA has also muzzled North Korea’s coastal batteries, which outnumber South Korea’s by a factor of between three and five, and narrowed the North’s defensive lines in the demilitarized zone (DMZ) by forcing it to shut down guard posts. The agreement was aimed at relaxing tension and preventing accidental clashes between the two sides. Needless to say, it includes measures that make it harder to operate military assets. In that sense, while it’s not completely inaccurate to say that the South Korean military’s hands are tied, acknowledging that the North Korean military’s hands are tied, too, is necessary to balance the scales. Similar idea proposed under Lee Myung-bak administration There’s nothing wrong with asking whether the CMA’s benefits outweigh its costs. But stirring up anxiety by depicting the agreement as crippling our military and setting the stage for impending doom is a distortion of the facts. Documents disclosed by Democratic Party lawmaker Rep. Choi Jae-seong during the parliamentary audit of the Defense Ministry in October show that the terms of the agreement had been reviewed by previous administrations. In fact, an arms control plan drafted by the administration of ex-president Lee Myung-bak in 2011 proposed setting up a buffer zone along the military demarcation line (MDL) and the NLL, the very idea that has been so controversial of late. This arms control plan even said that “economic aid could be used as leverage to persuade North Korea if it becomes hesitant.” And 2011 was just one year after North Korea’s sinking of the Cheonan corvette and its bombing of Yeonpyeong Island, when inter-Korean military tension was at its height. If the opponents’ arguments are to be taken seriously, this would mean that the South Korean military planned to disarm itself at a time of immense danger, which is clearly preposterous. Generals who were in charge of arms control at that time but are now spearheading the opposition to the CMA — a situation hard to regard as anything but blatant hypocrisy. Short-term disadvantages and advantages irrelevant in face of long-term peace Depending on one’s perspective, some parts of the agreement may work to our advantage and others to our disadvantage. But short-term advantages and disadvantages aren’t the whole picture. In the Apr. 27 Panmunjom Declaration, the leaders of South and North Korea agreed to move forward with step-by-step arms reduction. The CMA was the first step in that direction and thus includes short-term advantages and disadvantages that will merge into the long process of arms control and reduction. By relaxing tensions between South and North Korea, this process will also make it easier for North Korea to choose to move forward with denuclearization. Some opponents ask how we can trust North Korea. If the North Korean military commits a provocation after pretending to abide by the agreement, they argue, South Korea will be left holding the bag. But the moment that the North Korean military violates the agreement, the South Korean military is no longer bound by it either. The North Korean military is unlikely to commit a provocation given its fear of retribution from the South Korean military. In fact, inter-Korean arms control is also necessary in light of changes to the social structure. The South Korean military is planning to maintain the level of 500,000 troops after the mid-2020s, but many are concerned that the “demographic cliff” and the shorter period of service will result in an insufficient number of troops. North Korea also faces a falling birth rate and is reportedly feeling the economic crunch of maintaining a large standing army. Arms control and reduction could be a choice in which South and North Korea’s interests coincide. By Park Byong-su, editorial writer Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]
