The documents essentially point to the fact that from the start of the negotiations the Korean government hastily sought to accept U.S. demands for strategic flexibility, and that, knowing it could possibly run contrary to the mutual defense treaty between the two nations, it sought a joint statement instead of a diplomatic memorandum in order to avoid having to get National Assembly approval. This is something that relates to the political identity of the Participatory Government and its insistence on "balanced diplomacy," and it goes against the principle of government by the people. Choi's disclosures and how he came across the documents are smaller questions by comparison.
To begin with, it is hard to understand how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade gave the draft of a memorandum to the Americans in October 2003 without ample consultation at higher levels within the government, and how that fact was not reported to the president and the National Security Council (NSC) for months. That is something that would not happen even in a newly independent state.
Even more important is why the government abandoned the method of exchanging a memorandum. The government believed that a memorandum might conflict with the mutual defense treaty, and that the process of getting the National Assembly's approval could spread to a debate about the alliance as a whole. The documents say that the joint statement issued instead of a memorandum is a political document expressing common understanding, and that since the mutual defense treaty stipulates legal rights and obligations the two would not conflict. In other words, strategic flexibility might run contrary to the treaty, but if agreed on in the form of a joint statement it would not. That is logic designed to trick the country.
Recognizing strategic flexibility means it is more likely Korea could be dragged into an international dispute even when it does not want to. The government needs to explain to the country how much it is going to be able to prevent that possibility and why Korea should accept strategic flexibility right now and accept the risk involved, and then it should ask the Korean public what it thinks. It should go public with the details of the negotiation process and put the agreement to a vote by the National Assembly.
The Hankyoreh, 4 February 2006.
[Translations by Seoul Selection]
