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IAEA inspectors arrived in North Korea to conduct a special inspection into the contentious Yongbyon nuclear facilities in 2004.
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Chung Woo-sik, Spokesman of the Peace Network
America says they will respond positively to North Korea, but they are the ones who have created unnecessary distractions. The Bush administration should take the first step by proposing direct negotiations with North Korea and alleviating economic sanctions.
The "Libya Model" is once more drawing interest in the wake of America’s removal of Libya from its list of terror-supporting nations and in its of adopting measures for diplomatic normalization. In December 2003, when Libya announced its disposal of weapons of mass destruction, the Libya Model, in which "normalization takes place after the disposal of weapons of mass destruction" surfaced among some South Koreans and Americans as a model for North Korea to follow. Having died down, this topic reemerged once more in America and South Korea when, on May 15, the U.S. State Department announced a complete restoration of diplomatic relations with Libya.
The reason for America and Libya’s newfound friendship
The focus of interest is now on what influence the Libya Model will exert upon the deadlocked North Korean nuclear issue. While stating that "Libya serves as an important model to countries like North Korea and Iran," Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice alsoemphasized that, "just as 2003 was a turning point for the people of Libya, so can 2006 be a turning point for the people of North Korea and Iran." Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon stated that "Libya disposed of weapons of mass destruction by its own will and thus became the recipient of several kinds of incentives from the U.S." Minister Ban continued, "I urge North Korea to recognize they will have a good, bright future if they dispose of their nuclear program and promptly return to the six-party talks so that the North Korean nuclear issue may be resolved."
However, there were motivations for the normalization of relations with Libya beyond merely the disposal of weapons of mass destruction. The facts that the Bush administration needed Libya’s cooperation in the "War on Terror" and that Libya is an important oil-producing country were also considered. While there were strong incentives for the Bush administration to "befriend" Libya, North Korea is still regarded as an enemy, and America even goes so far as to stubbornly cling to the notion of regime change. On the surface, it seems that North Korea is the one rejecting the Libya Model. However, if one traces back the course of negotiations, it is clear that America’s attitudes toward North Korea and Libya are diametrically opposed. First of all, the Bush Administration bartered diplomatic normalization in exchange for the disposal of weapons of mass destruction through a process of "direct negotiations" with Libya. In contrast, they rejected "direct negotiations" with North Korea, and clearly presented no enticements. Eager to escape from international isolation by means of diplomatic normalization with America, Libya entered into secret negotiations with the U.S. in March of 2003 before the invasion of Iraq. Upon receiving the promise of diplomatic normalization, Libya announced its elimination of weapons of mass destruction on December 19, 2003. They did not dispose of their weapons of mass destruction for fear of "being the next target after Iraq," but rather because of America’s direct negotiations and presentation of incentives. Through the process of executing the joint agreement, the two sides were also able to build mutual trust. Having established contact from the late 1990s for the purpose of improving relations, the two countries poured their efforts into resolving the bombing of Pan Am flight 103, and America carried out trust-building measures, as seen in their concurrence to the revocation of UN sanctions. Libya’s abandonment of weapons of mass destruction and America’s determination for diplomatic normalization was accomplished upon a foundation of trust that promises would be kept. On the other hand, the Clinton administration implemented the Geneva Agreement at a snail’s pace, and the Bush Administration labeled North Korea an "outpost of tyranny" and a member of the "axis of evil," all the while making them a potential target of a preemptive strike, thus fanning the flames of distrust. The Bush Administration "inherited" the substance of negotiations with Libya from their preceding regime, but utterly disregarded the negotiations that had had been conducted with North Korea. At the very end of the Clinton administration’s tenure, there was a proposal under consideration under which the missile dispute would be settled. Also, the North Korea - U.S. Joint Communique was adopted, demonstrating the will for diplomatic normalization and the construction of a framework for peaceful relations. The Bush administration did not so much as acknowledge this proposal or Communique. Rather, using the threat of North Korea as pretext, the administration embarked on an agenda of empowering domestic military interests through such measures as construction of a missile defense system, preferring to ostracize North Korea when the proper time presented itself. It is in such a context that one may say that the side that rejected the Libya Model was none other than the Bush administration itself. In any case, by deleting Libya from the list of terror-supporting nations after Iraq, the list is now left with five nations, starting with North Korea, and followed by Iran, Cuba, Sudan and Syria. Even while acknowledging that North Korea has not supported any terrorist acts since the 1987 bombing of the Korean Airlines passenger airplane, in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks the Bush administration has justified adding North Korea to the list of terror-supporting nations under the suspicion that they are expanding their weapons of mass destruction program. They validate the maintenance of North Korea on this list by referring to the evidence of illegal activities, including currency forgery and narcotics trafficking, as well as suspicion regarding the kidnapping of Japanese citizens and people of other foreign lands. The connection between economic sanctions and designation as a terror-supporting nation The problems do not stop at the negative image arising out of North Korea’s being labeled as a terror-supporting state. Economic sanctions number among the problems, as well. Though America eased economic sanctions on North Korea from the late 1980s until 2000, by continuing to designate North Korea as a terrorist supporting nation, this alleviation hardly had any effect. In designating North Korea as a terror-supporting state, America has taken four basic measures. These include the imposition of an embargo on the export and sale of weapons related-exports to North Korea, regulations on the export of double-usage items, a ban on economic support, and limitations on finance. Seen in reverse, if America were to remove North Korea from the list of terror-supporting states, it would be the equivalent of providing a scaffold for the resolution of North Korean economic hardships. Moreover, if the ban on financial activities of such financial institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were revoked, North Korea would be able to make an economic recovery via international funding. By scrapping the ban on aid and financial interaction under such laws as the Export-Import Bank Act, American enterprises and international society would be able to exert significant influence in revitalizing commerce with North Korea. Moreover, America’s dissolution of sanctions against North Korea would lead to the lowering of excessive tariffs and the increase of North Korean exports to America. In addition, by mitigating America’s export regulations, investment in industrial plants and equipment could be revitalized. Obviously, South-North economic cooperation, intertwined as it is with the system of regulations placed on strategic materials, would also receive a greater degree of flexibility. However, the possibility that North Korea will be removed from the list of terror-supporting nations within the term of the Bush Administration is very low. Quite the opposite, the Bush Administration is not only raising the bar for removal of sanctions, but is also raising the intensity of sanctions on sea vessels and financing and also implementing the WMD-related Proliferation Security Initiative against North Korea. In "maliciously disregarding" North Korea's requests for dialogue and in strengthening sanctions in the face of appeals for their mitigation, one cannot help but feel suspicion in regards to the Bush Administration's ultimate objective.
