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반기문 외교부 장관
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In an exclusive interview with The Hankyoreh on August 4, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Ban Ki-moon said that "there is no difference of opinion between America and South Korea regarding North Korea’s participation in the six-party talks, and we see [those talks] as providing the leeway for further negotiations."
Minister Ban said "America has shown a willingness to discuss all financial issues, including that of Banco Delta Asia [where North Korean bank accounts have been frozen on the suspicion of money laundering] within the six-party framework upon North Korea’s return." Reasoning that "America is showing flexibility," he urged North Korea to take advantage of the opportunity before it. He added, "if the North returns to the six-party talks, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill’s visiting North Korea may be discussed, and more importantly, the North will be able to hold direct discussions with the U.S. regarding the Banco Delta Asia issue."
He also indicated that a U.S.-South Korea summit conference was forecast for this coming September, at which comprehensive strategic issues, such as that of the North Korean missile launch and Northeast Asian security, will be discussed. On a similar note, President Roh Moo-hyun hosted the Security Ministerial Meeting on July 19, at which he demanded a basic plan in which countries in the region, sharing a common understanding, would formulate a basic plan of resolution [of the North Korean missile and nuclear crises] rather than resorting to confrontational measures.
In the interview, Minister Ban also said, in regards to the plan for resolving the nuclear and missile issues at once, that the Korean government is also "proactively discussing an all-inclusive agreement" and emphasized that "the most important thing in these circumstances is that the North not take additional measures to exacerbate the situation."
Q. The search for a diplomatic resolution to the North Korean missile issue failed at the July ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations] Regional Forum. Some assert that this showed the limits of South Korean diplomacy, but what do you think?
A. That sort of assertion is misguided. Even while communicating the clear and firm message of the international community, we maintained our "balanced two-part approach" by emphasizing several times that the door must remain open for discussion through the six-party talks and through direct North-South links. Another success was our taking advantage of the ASEAN Regional Forum to play a lead role in bilateral and multilateral discussions and displaying a balanced perspective. That being said, it is truly regretful that the North rejected the U.N. Security Council resolution outright, thus continuing down the road of self-isolation.
Q. Do America and South Korea hold a shared opinion on the desirability of the execution of the September 19 Joint Statement and the resumption of the six-party talks?
A. There is no difference between the assessments of America and South Korea. This was reconfirmed in a conference with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. There are some who doubt that America values the six-party talks, but [Rice] strongly asserted that their assertions were not true. She also asserted the necessity of a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through the six-party talks and that there is no change in her position on the de-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. I think of these positions as very good ones, leaving room for future negotiations.
Q. The problem is that there is no chance of America dissolving the financial sanctions, which North Korea is demanding. Do you think there is any chance that North Korea will retract this demand?
A. Basically, the six-party talks and the circumstances that the North has brought about through its assorted illegal activities are separate issues. The North’s setting of prerequisite conditions [for their return to the six-party talks] is mistaken. However, with our convincing, America stated that they would be willing to discuss all financial issues, including that of Banco Delta Asia [BDA], if the North returns to the six-party talks. America has shown flexibility here. It would be wise for the North to take advantage of this opportunity.
Q. What about the option of the BDA account being unfrozen in exchange for China agreeing to take responsibility for the funds [in order to prevent money laundering]? I heard that this plan was discussed at one point.
A. South Korea is not in a position to say anything about this. Before this became a Chinese problem, it was an issue that emerged within the framework of international financial transactions.
Q. On March 7 at the meeting between North Korea and America in New York, the North suggested the formation of a "temporary American-North Korean consultative body to deal with financial issues." Do you think it would be a viable plan for America to accept this, China to unfreeze the accounts, and North Korea agreeing to return to the six-party talks?
A. I am under the impression that America holds the position that the establishment of a temporary consultative body to deal with North Korea’s illegal activities is inappropriate. I think that at this point, discussion of that is improper.
Q. At the time, North Korea showed a proactive posture, reporting that if America provided concrete evidence they would punish the pertinent people and confiscate the [counterfeiting technology], but America did not buy this. Is it not because of this that some suspect America has put the six-party talks on the backburner, and is rather pursuing regime change through financial sanctions?
A. America has made clear many times that it is not attempting to topple the regime. It is not something we should be so suspicious about.
Q. It is said that President Roh, in a dinner session with officials and assembly members, stated that America’s style of pressuring North Korea was similar to a posture of shooting first and asking questions later. Was he referring to America’s attitude of calling North Korea a criminal [state] and demanding a confession from them, all the while not presenting any supporting evidence?
A. As I was not present at the event and am unaware of the full context, it is inappropriate for me to comment. In theory, it is possible for America to put forth its evidence in response to which the North would take necessary measures. However, the specialists of America and other countries agree that if America presents its evidence, that would give [North Korea] an opportunity to both protest and develop techniques to [further evade counterfeiting detection], and thus they say international custom justifies not doing so.
Q. On June 1, the North Korean Foreign Minister extended a formal invitation to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill to visit Pyongyang. According to the principal of simultaneous action, would it not be possible for Assistant Secretary Hill to visit Pyongyang concurrent to North Korea’s returning to the six-party talks?
A. I met with Secretary Rice and National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and suggested indirectly our position that it is necessary to discuss the matter rather than rejecting it outright. The problem is as of yet unresolved because North Korea is rejecting all opportunities while bringing up the sole issue of financial sanctions. If the North returns to the six-party talks, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill’s visiting North Korea may be discussed, and more importantly, the North will be able to hold direct discussions with the U.S. regarding the Banco Delta Asia issue.
Q. It is said that after the adoption of the September 19 Joint Statement last year, when there was discussion of Assistant Secretary Hill visiting North Korea, that America expected proactive measures from North Korea, such as the ceasing of operations at the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor. Is there no possibility of Assistant Secretary Hill using the opportunity of visiting the North to comprehensively solve both the nuclear and missile issues?
A. A comprehensive deliberation regarding these problems is being actively discussed. The spirit of the September 19 Joint Statement is in comprehensively approaching all issues rather than solving them one by one.
Q. If North Korea maintains its demands that the Banco Delta Asia bank account be unfrozen and that financial sanctions be lifted, do you see them going on to adopt further measures to aggravate the situation?
A. The most important thing in these circumstances is that the North not take additional measures to exacerbate the situation. That is why we are strongly urging North Korea to not take additional measures that would worsen their situation. If North Korea returns to the six-party talks, there is hope of resolution. The congested relations between North and South can be resolved, the six-party talks can progress, and we will be able to manage movements for sanctions within the international community.
Q. Relations between America and South Korea are facing strong domestic criticism on the matters of restationing American soldiers in South Korea, strategic flexibility, reorganization of the alliance, and the free trade agreement. Whether conservative or liberal, all agree, "we have given [the U.S.] everything that can be given." What have we gained?
A. I think that perspective is imprecise. Diplomatic relations must progress such that both countries receive reciprocal benefits. We resolved the 20-30 year-old issues of moving the Yongsan base and American embassy. Also, while acknowledging America’s need for strategic flexibility in the 21st century, we gained America’s understanding that we do not want American soldiers intervening in a conflict in Northeast Asia that we do not agree with. As for the issue of shifting U.S. military bases, the U.S. is returning some 52 million pyeong [172 million square meters] to us and we are supplying them with about 3.5 million pyeong.
Q. What discussions do you see taking place in regards to bilateral relations at the upcoming September Korean-American Summit Conference?
A. There is the issue of bridging perceptions in relation to the situation caused by the missile launch. Going beyond the North Korean nuclear issue, I think that there will probably be strategic and comprehensive discussions in regards to the structure of [relations on] the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asia.
Q. Some are saying that a bilateral free trade agreement between South Korea and the U.S. will be difficult to achieve. Do you worry that a rupture of the talks would result in the worsening of South Korean-American relations?
A. It is necessary to understand that by confidently and proactively pursuing this, it will be of benefit to national interest. As discussions surrounding the Doha Development Agenda have made little progress, negotiations on the bilateral free trade agreement must be expedited.
Q. Will the September U.S.-South Korean Summit Conference also cover the issue of the free trade agreement?
A. I expect that rather than concrete details, [the political direction of both sides] will be discussed.
This interview was conducted by reporter Kang Tae Ho, Lee Je Hoon and translated by Daniel Rakove.
