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The Zaitun division.
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The Hankyoreh finds many incidents unreported
In early July, the Defense Ministry invited major newspapers and magazines, including The Hankyoreh 21, to a briefing on South Korea’s defense policy and related issues. The topics covered included the South Korea-U.S. alliance, the relocation of U.S. forces in Korea, trust building between two Koreas’ militaries, and the recent crash of a fighter jet during training. There was no mention of Zaytun, the division of South Korean troops deployed in Iraq. They are 3,000-odd soldiers putting their life at risk in the city of Arbil. Many countries that reluctantly sent their troops to Iraq in consideration of their relations with the U.S., all the while holding the unofficial opinion that the war lacked just cause, have since withdrawn their troops or have plans to do so. But nowhere in the defense briefing was the mention of such a plan. The Defense Ministry perhaps hopes that citizens do not pay much attention to the South Korean troops in Iraq; by keeping a low profile, the ministry may be hoping that it can get away with another extension of the troops’ tour of duty. The same holds true for lawmakers. The majority of them voted for deploying troops to Iraq and have twice approved the extension of their time there.The Hankyoreh 21 wanted to know how much the National Assembly pays attention to the Korean troops stationed in Iraq. We searched through documents from the Assembly’s plenary sessions, its Defense Committee, and its Foreign Affairs and Trade Committee. We found that there was some debate surrounding the extension issue last December. But since the beginning of this year, Korean troops in Iraq have not once been mentioned in any of the Assembly sessions. What place will South Korea’s dispatch of troops to Iraq have in its history? The Hankyoreh 21 is particularly interested in those soldiers who have come back from their time in Iraq. We interviewed nearly 30 who were officers and enlisted soldiers. Most of them have since returned to society, now working in civilian jobs. But all wished to remain anonymous, given the sensitivity of the issue. Some shared with The Hankyoreh information that fills in the gaps found in official government announcements. How Many Rocket Attacks? On May 29, 2005, at 11 p.m., the emergency alarm sounded at the Zaytun compound. The soldiers there, who were sleeping in container-transformed barracks, woke up suddenly, hurriedly put on their bulletproof vests, and got down on the floor as they were instructed to do in their field manual. The compound was attacked by rocket bombs for some five minutes. This was the first ever attack on the Zaytun company. Although the attack was soon over, no one slept that night. An interviewee who was there during the attack told The Hankyoreh 21, "When I was working inside the compound, they told us to wear the protective vest all the time. I didn’t like it because it was too heavy. But on that night, for the first time, I had the feeling that I had come to a real battlefield. I was scared to realize that it was possible I could die there." Investigation into the incident began the next morning. Two days later, the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced in a breifing that the rocket bombs that had hit the Zaytun compound were 107 mm multiple-launch rockets, four of them. It also added that the investigation was conducted by a team of investigators from the Zaytun unit, U.S. intelligence, and an Iraqi militia unit called Peshumelga. At the briefing, the JCS said that Iraqi insurgents fired the rockets from a makeshift launchpad 4 km from the Korean military base. Of the four rockets, three detonated. The same report was submitted to the South Korea’s presidential office. But during the interviews, The Hankyoreh 21 heard a different story of what happened. An ex-soldier said, "A total of two bombs were dropped: one near the mess hall, the other somewhere else in the compound." Another added, "One exploded; the other misfired." The other interviewees who were stationed in Zaytun at that time also said that they saw a sunken crater in the ground near the mess hall. From the soldiers’ testimonials, there were four bomb hits outside of the military compound and two inside the compound. The total number amounts to six, not the figure of four given by the JCS. The Hankyoreh 21 sought a confirmation from the JCS Press Service on August 23. An official there said, "The investigation was conducted jointly by the U.S. military and Iraqi investigators. There’s no reason for us to conceal what happened." Who Is Telling the Truth? Those who served in Iraq and are testifying anonymously regarding what happened there have nothing to gain by minimizing the scale of danger. The military authorities, however, are a different story. Any direct attack on the Korean compound could very easily lead to casualties. This would in turn cause public opinion to deteriorate regarding the troops being stationed in Iraq and could lead to their complete withdrawal. It is in the JCS’ interest, then, to keep public information regarding risks at a minimum. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also have a previous history of trying to hide various incidents for fear of damaging public opinion. One day before President Roh Moo-hyun’s visit to the Zaytun unit in December 2004, there was an incident of friendly fire. The Zaytun compound has three layers of guards. The outside layer is patrolled by Iraqi Kurds, the inner layer Korean troops, and the middle area is jointly patrolled. The incident occurred in one of the middle area guard posts. A Kurd guard and a Zaytun solider, friends, were horsing around when one of the soldiers’ guns misfired. The Kurd soldier was hit and died six days later. The JCS covered up the incident, making an official announcement in April 2005, after the media had publicized the shooting. In another incident, there was an accidental explosion 800m from the Zaytun compound in October 2004. There were no human casualties: the victims were 24 lambs passing by at the wrong time. South Korea’s Defense Ministry announced that the explosion was likely caused by a buried bomb or landmine, based on the shape and angle of the explosion. But Zaytun veterans testified that it had been a mortar attack. A veteran said, "When the U.S. team investigated the incident, they said it was an enemy attack. But the [South Korean Defense Ministry] change the wording to say that it had been a landmine. Troops there at the time did not trust the official announcement, because sheep passed by the site daily," and would have likely tripped a previously buried mine long before. Additionally, the "landmine" incident happened only six hours after Zaytun troops were banned from leaving the inner compound after intelligence was received of a possible terror attack against Koreans in Iraq. Other testimonials are equally shocking. According to multiple sources, a key Iraqi insurgent went under disguise and was able to work as an interpreter inside the Zaytun compound from December 2004 to May 2005. He allegedly tried to put poison into the food served at the mess hall, sparking an emergency alert. This individual disappeared right after a suicide bomb attack on the Arbil Police Recruitment Center on May 4, 2005. He was later determined to be the younger brother of the insurgent militia group’s leader, Sheikh Jadaan. The veterans said that investigators found evidence of a poisoning attempt. Even those who were at the compound at the time but did not know the details said, "One day we got an order to destroy all watermelons we had received from town. The watermelons were very popular among soldiers because they were so delicious. I heard that it had something to do with a poisoning attempt." The JCS offered an explanation: "Although it is true that the arrested insurgent leader Sheikh Jadaan mentioned something about a poisoning attempt, and although it is also true that someone alleged to be his brother had worked in the Korean military compound from December 2004, he stopped reporting to work on May 1, 2005, and there was no evidence of an attempted poisoning." The Danger Within While on one hand there were threats of rocket bomb attacks and a likely poisoning attempt by Iraqi insurgents opposed to the presence of foreign troops on Iraqi soil, there were also at least three cases of the mishandling of arms within the Zaytun company itself that could have led to a large-scale human tragedy. In the Zaytun compound, all soldiers are required to carry live ammunition and wear bulletproof vests. According to statements from various Zaytun veterans, a non-commissioned officer (NCO) in the Special Forces unit was going through severe stress for not being up to snuff on the company’s demanding drills. One day, when he was on guard duty with his machine rifle, he suddenly started to fire randomly at other NCOs who were running on the track. No one was hit. In another incident, a veteran who served in the transportation unit said that "there was a misfiring of a K-3 automatic machine gun over our convoy trucks. It was from one of our own. Luckily, there was no real ammunition in it at the time. Maybe it was a mistake...or the guy just wanted to pull the trigger." If we include the misfiring incidents which happened during routine gun inspections, the number is double that of the official defense ministry figure. Nonetheless, the JCS report summarizing the friendly fire incidents during a two-year period at Zaytun, submitted to lawmaker Lim Jong-in of the ruling Uri Party, included only one incident, the death of the Kurd soldier mentioned above. As of today, a total of 26 individuals had to cut short their tour of duty in Iraq and come home. Among them, 19 are included in the broadly defined category of ’mishandling of arms and safety issues.’ The individuals who "accidentally" pulled the trigger are said to be among them. A Tenuous Safety The Hankyoreh 21 has concluded that the Arbil region where the Korean troops are stationed is relatively safe compared to other places in Iraq. But it is not as safe as the government maintains. The soldiers there have faced many moments of crisis that could have had the potential of multiple human casualties. The danger is still there. Despite all these situations, the government appears to be focusing its attention on hiding facts and minimizing reports of dangers faced by Korean troops in Iraq. Regarding the Zaytun division, the latest announcement from the Defense Ministry was "to downsize 1,000 troops to maintain a 2,300 manpower level. Other than that, nothing else has yet been decided." It also added, "We are in the process of assessing the current Iraqi situation and the necessity of troops in Iraq in regard to the extension of the Korean military presence there." No government bodies, including the presidential office, show any sign of proposing troop withdrawal. Given that, it is very likely that the troop extension will likely to pass in the National Assembly by the end of the year. It is a sin to send young people of our nation to a remote and dangerous place and then forget about them. We have to be responsible for them. We have to keep raising the issue. Does sending troops to Iraq serve the national interest? Is it truly helping Iraq? And when can we bring our sons back home?
