[Analysis] Weighing further sanctions on the North

Foreign diplomats in Seoul listen to a South Korean official explaining the North Korean situation.

On July 16, soon after the United Nations Security Council adopted a resolution condemning North Korea’s missile tests, the communist country issued a statement calling the move by the international organization "illicit and extortive." The North ended its statement by declaring that it would strengthen its war deterrent capacity "with all possible means and methods."

On October 3, announcing its plans to conduct a nuclear test, the North made it clear that in its eyes the United States had declared an ultimatum by adopting the resolution. The word "deterrent capacity" turned out to be Pyongyang’s test announcement.

The North declared on October 9 that it had indeed carried out this test. If the North’s stance is extended, it could mean that the North may opt for a "one-way road" to war if the Security Council goes ahead with a tougher resolution in response to the claimed test.

In hindsight, the first North Korean nuclear crisis, occurring in 1994, was prompted not by the U.S.’s hard-line policies, but by the U.N.’s pursuit of sanctions against the North. At the time, skepticism was rife regarding the efficacy of these sanctions as China, then one of the North’s closest allies, remained opposed to the measures. Nevertheless, Pyongyang showed a belligerent attitude, calling the move "an ultimatum." In March 1994, it went as far as to threaten to turn Seoul into "a sea of fire," precipitating a crisis in the region and seeing the U.S. step up its military readiness.

In this regard, if the Security Council adopts a resolution this time around and the U.S., based on the decision, strengthens its efforts to contain the North, it is apparent what action the North would take. Peace would not be guaranteed any longer on the Korean peninsula, and things could get even worse depending on the level of the U.N. punishment. It should be recalled that under the truce signed after the 1950-53 Korean War, any kind of containment involving the Korean peninsula is prohibited.

Among other things, the level of tension will intensify around the demilitarized zone. As shown in the past when such provocative acts took place, the North will intentionally raise security tensions in the area. On October 7, a few days after the announcement that it would go ahead with a nuclear test, five North Korean soldiers crossed the demarcation line. They retreated after South Korea guards fired warning shots.

There is no expert who sees North Korea just sit and wait for further sanctions to be imposed. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry issued a statement on October 11 saying that if the U.S. increases "pressure" and "harm" against it, it will continue to take countermeasures and consider the U.S. actions a declaration of war. Against this backdrop, it would represent too high a level of complacency to conclude that the North has played all of its cards. Pyongyang could take the U.N.’s envisioned sanctions as an excuse to conduct additional missile and nuclear tests. The final resort could be the crossing of the line drawn in the sand: the promise that the North would never first use nuclear weapons and would not proliferate.