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Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok/By Kim jin su
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In an exclusive interview wth Jang Jungsoo, English Editor of the Hankyoreh, Lee Jong-seok, Unification Minister, elaborated in detail to questions on bilateral issues including North Korea’s human rights, the South Korea-U.S. alliance, and the situation in East Asia in general. Since he was appointed as unification minister early this year, Mr. Lee has been playing a crucial role in formulating and coordinating government policies on North Korea. This two-hour interview was held on May 15 in commemoration of the launching of the Hankyoreh’s English-language edition.
Following are the scripts of the interview with Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok.
Q: I understand that you visited the Kaesung Industrial Complex on May 9. How is the progress coming along there?
A: When I visited the Kaesung Industrial Plant on May 9, I stressed that "the production at Kaesung Industrial Plant must not stop." Unless there is a war or similarly extreme situation, the factory must continue to function. After all, Isn't it natural that production must continue?
Q: What do you see as the background to U.S. Special Envoy on Human Rights in North Korea Jay Lefkowitz's discussion of the human rights of the workers at Kaesung Industrial Complex?
A: Could it be for anything else than to apply pressure?
Q: It is indeed pressure, but is the objective here regime change or is it more designed to appeal to the U.S. domestic audience?
A: That is hard to say. Each official [in the current U.S. administration] is different, but I think that the basic position of the U.S. State Department is something other than regime change. The hawks in America, especially the people who exert great influence over America's human rights policies seem to favor regime transformation.
Q. It seems that it is not all that welcome. Until now, it was said that [an inter-Korean summit] would not be possible until the nuclear situation reached resolution.
A. Well didn't I put forth the suggestion several times that a summit conference be convened? I suppose that people may have taken it lightly because I'm merely a minister, but now that it's the President who said it himself, people attach the label of "official proposal" to it (laughs).
Q. Well President Roh had never said the words himself, but out of the blue, there it was. Is there not some suspicion that Chairman Kim Jong-il will actually come out for the talks? What do you see as the prospects for success of a summit meeting?
A. We've been talking about this nonstop. President Roh has taken a slightly more engaged stance now, hasn't he? (Pause) Well, I don't see the talks as being impossible to pull off. But at this point there is no way of knowing who will be there to represent the other side.
Q. I saw this the other night on the news - that the feeling resembles [Former President Kim Dae-jung's] Berlin proclamation of 2000. I thought there might be something to that.
A. Well, in that instance Former President Kim Dae-jung had been giving proclamations from the very outset, and in this case President Roh is now, [midway through his term,] taking a more proactive stance.
Q. What is the background behind this shift?
A. Is it not true that the six-party talks are being delayed?
Q. At about what point in time did President Roh start to wrestle with the thought of taking a change in direction?
A. I suppose one may say it is a product of how the November six-party talks ended on the issue of forged money. President Roh takes a much more realistic outlook on the six-party talks than any of us. It was he who said that the talks would not be smooth sailing, you know.
Q. It took quite a long time for him to wrestle with this issue then, didn't it?
A. Yes, of course.
Q. Isn't it Chairman Kim Jong-il who will ultimately have to take a stand on the issue of the six-party talks?
A. This is what we are thinking. As America cannot budge anymore [in negotiations], we are emphasizing the fact that North Korea's return to the table will be helpful, and certainly not harmful. Rather than explaining President Roh's statement, I would rather talk about South-North relations in the big picture.
Q. Even at the last ministerial conference, was it not regularly emphasized [by the South] that things could only be resolved if the North returned to the talks?
A. I wouldn't say that it was emphasized "regularly."
Q. I'm quite curious as to how the North Korean leadership is assessing the situation.
A. I cannot give you their assessment of the present situation with much certainty. However, while they are not all united on the method of resolution, I think that the faction that is exerting critical influence has little confidence in the situation. The so-called hard-liners of North Korea are perhaps viewing the simple fact that their delegation returned [empty-handed] as raising questions of whether there is in fact anything to be gained through the talks, or whether North Korea is merely being forced into a humiliating position before America through them.
Q. President Roh said that he would make many concessions. What do you suppose these many concessions will entail?
A. He is not necessarily making any assumptions [in regards to what the concessions will entail]. However, the contents of the speech you are referring to are not tied to particular suppositions, but rather, while protecting our principles and making it a prerequisite to convince our countrymen, the President said that we will make all efforts necessary to build confidence, and that we will take a more effective and active stance. More than promising any particular support or concessions, the President emphasized that from here on, the crucial thing is the will to solve this problem even if only by means of South-North bilateral relations. There is no necessity to analyze the speech beyond that.
Q. And you will make no expectations of North Korea?
A. The Fund for South-North Exchange and Cooperation is one trillion two hundred billion Won. If only given good justification, we can spend all of it, right? First of all, the important thing is that North Korea give us justification to use it. Isn't it important that we tell the South Korean people what these funds will be used for? Rather than expecting any certain concession from the North, we see the door to aid opening if the North responds to us rationally and more proactively. That is to say, there is no specific proposal that we are awaiting from the North.
Q. Before President Roh's trip to Mongolia, to what degree did he fine-tune his statement with his staff?
A. There was no fine-tuning by his staff whatsoever. However, it is true that he had met with the ministers in charge of national security before he left.
Q. Has there been any reaction from North Korea in regards to the President's statement?
A. Did the North react? North Koreans don't show much reaction to this sort of thing.
Q. In order to give that sort of statement is some sort of background briefing given to the U.S.?
A. The President referred to this in an answer to one of his questions but the core of the statement was in finding a breakthrough to the difficult situation at hand. America is hanging its hopes in regards to the Six Party Talks on Former President Kim Dae-jung's trip [to the North]. America doesn't have much objection to that. What I'm saying is that if there is some sort of concrete proposal we will make explanations to the U.S., but in this instance that was not the case.
Q. You mean just out of general consideration?
A. Yes that's right. Of course, it has been demonstrated that the President is thinking more proactively in regards to these matters.
Q. Does it seem likely that North Korea will show up at the six-party Talks?
A. They will if we give them a reason to. North Korea is not avoiding the talks on purpose or by intent. We have to give them reason to attend - but that is a difficult issue indeed.
Q. Judging by the talk regarding human rights in North Korea the other day, I think that it won't be easy.
A. The issue of human rights cannot be seen in direct connection to the six-party talks.
Q. From the view of an analyst of North Korean policies, even if North Korea returns to the six-party talks, Washington’s continual mentioning of the human rights issue causes doubt as to whether the U.S. truly has the determination to find a resolution.
A. But what we are saying is that North Korea is already being pressured on the fronts of forged currency and human rights, so it would be better if we just put financial issues into the framework of the six-party talks, and leave the other issues, whether they be illegal drugs or human right problems as secondary topics. We are discussing just how we can get North Korea to come out to the six-party talks again. If I had been there, I would not have raised those issues.
Q. This time, it is the North Korean hard-liners who have to make a decision, right? But, if they send a delegation, there must be the worry that the talks will break up once more. In that case, who should take responsibility?
A. If the North Koreans come, the six-party talks will not break up. The reason why is that the six-party talks are not the type of forum to bring forth immediate results, and if they come out, isn't it natural that forceful measures against them will be relaxed? This was communicated on my trip to Pyongyang - that attendance at the talks would be of the greatest benefit to their country. Is it not true that a joint declaration at the six-party talks will be of no detriment to North Korea?
Q. Isn't there something that can be done so that military circles in North Korea can be brought under control?
A. We have to give the North a reason to do so, and that is quite hard indeed. It's hard because America's not giving them any reasons to [bring the military circles under control].
Q. What's the background behind America's bringing forth of the human rights issue?
A. The human rights issue carries simultaneously both humanitarian and strategic sides to it. It is nice if they are raising the human rights issue from a purely humanitarian viewpoint, and I have said that it would be good if it did not become part of some political campaign. However, the issue of human rights has hardly been one to fully escape from the framework of diplomatic strategy to be employed wholly for pure reasons by a given country. That said, there is a difference between human rights policy devised by those charged with foreign policy and human rights policy devised by people representing domestic political necessity. Those crafting policy from the diplomatic level are more exact and disciplined in their management. In comparison, those operating in the context of domestic politics are much more coarse and give off a sense of unilateralism.
A. Not only America - when any country thinks of the process of growth, the bottom line is economic advancement. The process of economic development awakens people's consciousness of human rights and as their quality of life increases they open their eyes to their new spot in the world. As history has proven, human rights is not something that can be solved through mere extrapolation. The socialist countries are a case in point.
America may believe they are raising the issue of human rights purely out of pure motives, but the North Koreans see the leaders of NGOs exerting strong influence on America's human rights policies while calling for the destruction of North Korea, the destruction of their regime. From a North Korean perspective, it has become difficult to see statements favoring efforts for regime change as merely groundless words. What I'm saying is that we really have to be delicate in looking at this issue.
A. In regards to the North Korean human rights issue, The South Korean government sufficiently appreciates universal values on the matter; we worry about the North Korean human rights issue, we have supplied hundreds of thousands of tons of food rations and fertilizer to try to save the North Korean people from hunger in the belief that life itself is the most fundamental of human rights, we have accepted some 8,200 North Korean refugees all the while providing programs to assist them in their settlement. During the last ministrial talks in Pyongyang, I suggested that North Korea start dialogue with Western countries regarding the human rights , and I told the North Koreans that if they think some of the perspectives regarding their human rights issues are distorted, they should bring those critics to North Korea to show them the reality.
That said, in this perilous transition period where we are working to build harmony and cooperation, in the situation where the North condemns comments on its human rights as attempts at regime change, the only thing that our government is not doing is demanding publicly to the North they improve their human rights. I believe that in regards to this issue I must speak with confidence to the people of South Korea and the members of the international community that some countries are being accepted as pro-human rights nations for merely stating their support for human rights without sending a single grain of rice, a single spoonful of fertilizer or taking in a single North Korean refugee.
That said, because we have our own characteristics and are in a peculiar position, we ask for their understanding. I cannot predict the future, and perhaps the day will come when we can talk about this publicly, but I believe that day has yet to come. This is the reason why we talk about this issue in this way, and civil society must understand this as well. The matter of human rights is strategic. Is America concerning itself with the human rights situation in Israel? This situation reflects the extent to which America should deal strategically with North Korea .
Q. What is your forecast on the issues of the South Koreans kidnapped by the North, and prisoners of war? Will there be progress on these issues through Former President Kim's visit to the North?
A. I think we need to approach this issue in the long term. Judging by the conditions, we have made this a current topic [for further discussion], and the North expressed a small amount of concurrence [with our views]. Confirmation of death or reuniting families will all take time. Perhaps this should be reflected on again in two years or so. Without being hasty, we will give it all of our effort. We must not be lax about this, and at the same time we will strive to not wound North Korean honor. I do not know how former president Kim Dae-jung will speak on this matter - I think his words will be of some assistance - but the thought that he will find some solution and return with results is unrealistic and saddles him with an excessive yoke. Those who do not wholeheartedly welcome Kim's visit yet who desire so much from him are, to be honest, quite burdensome. Even just considering the very difficult issue of the six-party talks, I think that we must not put too much of a weight on former president Kim's shoulders. There is also the possibility that not a single agreement will be reached.
Q. If he meets Chairman Kim Jong-il, there must be some concession, no? He wouldn't hold the meeting for no reason after all. Also, it would be difficult for Chairman Kim to make a reciprocal visit to Seoul.
A. Well, in regards to a reciprocal visit to Seoul, we would welcome that at any time and any place.
Q. I think it would be nice if Chairman Kim Jong-il made a visit to Seoul by way of the united North-South railway line.
A. In summit meetings, the location is not important.
Q. Is there any progress in the investigation of Kim Young-nam, known to be the husband of [kidnapped Japanese citizen] Yokota Megumi? Is he truly Megumi's husband?
Not everyone is under the assumption that he is indeed the husband. DNA tests have not been performed, but it is a premise we are working with. When I was in North Korea, I referred to him as 'Kim Young-nam, the man known as Yokota Megumi's husband.' To this, the response from the North was that 'the concerned authorities are checking into this,' but does that not in itself show that there is indeed some confirmation of this premise? When I work to unravel South-North relations, this is the format I have done things in. I do not declare that I will do such and such for the people of Korea, but rather take a low-key posture without expectations, speak only of the basics, and if there is some success I report that to the people.
To my officials as well, I say you must never exaggerate, and rather, I tell them that if there are some results you must communicate only those. The Kim Young-nam issue is no different. Before going to the ministerial level conference in Pyongyang, I was quite curt in my comments to the people, almost as if I hadn't checked up on anything. Now that something has been achieved I speak of it - it is meaningless to simply speak of what one will achieve. Personally speaking, this is my personality. Thus, with the recent chain of events and with the President's comments on the matter of North Korea having broadened dramatically, I am feeling some burden. Some say that it would have been better had he not said those remarks, but on the other hand, now journalists are thinking more broadly.
Q. You have spent some three months as a minister, but altogether it seems like you've had a soft landing.
A. My staff has helped me enormously. It's also because I don't have any political ambitions. I have many things to do. Other ministers before me have also done things well. I have reformed many things in regards to organizational management, and the staff has ably followed along. I suppose this is all my good luck.
Q. I have heard that academics who become bureaucrats often have quite a difficult time.
A. Well, I'm not an academic (laughs). Rather than scattering staff members, I like to unite everyone together.
Q. I've heard that academics often do not enter this line of work.
A. I worked at the National Security Committee, you know. There is a tendency for scholars not to take up this kind of work, and there is certainly a risk to it. If a scholar comes bearing a vision, I think that there are two dangers to this. One is that the scholar who succeeds in organizational management is rare indeed. It's because they enter without ever having tried before. So they often abandon efforts at organizational management midway through or simply don't try. However, if they don't support the organization, then all of their showy proposals end up being just a flashy show of light, or discarded ideas.
Another thing is that judgments regarding the flexibility and appropriateness of a vision to reality must be made conservatively. If that is not done, then the results of policies are a game of all or nothing. The minister who takes all will be remembered favorably in the history books due to his good luck, but things don't usually work out that way. After all, there's also the minister who gets nothing, and becomes an utter failure. That's why when projecting one's ideas onto policy, one must be quite conservative in one's approach. To be honest, it is on this point that most scholars fail.
Q. Was your work at the NSC of much help?
A. You could say that. The problem lay in the organization itself. When I was appointed as Minister of Unification, all of the staff members were apprehensive. My job is called the 7-11: 7 AM to 11 PM. They say that the work takes over your life, and indeed, as soon as I took office I told my staff the 7-11 has now perished into a legend. So I installed a network program on my home computer so I can now work from my house. In the past three months, I have never arrived to the office before 8:00 AM. Furthermore, I have eaten lunch or dinner alone by myself only once, which was in my office. I am always meeting visitors, or when there are no visitors, I have dinner with my employees as I have done some 33 times. These meals were opportunities to get to know them so that we can be on the same page. At least that is how I think of them. I thought that the more hierarchical an organization is, the greater the notion there would be of a communal family, and if horizontal and vertical relations were woven together well, then organizational harmony would emerge. I now think that the stronger the hierarchy at an organization, the greater the necessity there is for community.
Q. I see that you take discipline and structure quite seriously.
A. Indeed I do. If there is someone but one year younger than me I speak to that person plainly, and if there is someone but one year my senior, I will speak to that person in the respectful tone. Managing the discipline of a company is not simply management. When I was still a nominee, I got a Lunar New Year’s candy box from the vice minister. At that time, there was no minister, you see. I asked who else had received the present, and was told that only senior officials higher than the level of bureau director-general had received them. Though only a nominee at the time, I said that if I became the minister, I would have everyone from the ministers down to the general employees receive the same present on the Lunar New Years and Chuseok. And I also said I would buy everyone a cake and a bottle of wine on their birthdays or wedding anniversaries. After a while, the Chief of General Affairs started to complainl, because the budget for general affairs was set to run out in three months. The reason for this was that a bidet had been set up in the minister's bathroom. So I said, well, if you're going to set one up here, then set them up everywhere, so now of all the government buildings, only the Department of Unification has bidets installed. I also bought everyone matching pairs of gym clothes. This is all because a true hierarchy can only exist after everything possible has been [done to support] the idea of being in the same family. That's why I tend to devote a lot of effort to the welfare of my employees. Now, the budget has run dry for general affairs so I'm trying to draw out some more through appropriations.
Q. After work, what sort of people do you generally meet with?
A. The people I meet most with are with people from social and religious organizations. I also meet with people from some conservative groups. I seek out all of these people.
Q. When you meet with religious organizations, what sorts of things do you discuss?
A. In South Korea, no matter the social organization, it is only to the Minister of Unification to whom everyone has something to say. The reason is that all of these groups are linked with certain ideals, and they have all made their opinion known on the issue of unification. I meet with these groups to foster national unity, and after that I also meet with people from the academic world, the press, with our own higher officials and also with regular employees.
Q. As a minister, if you were to say the obligation you viewed most important, what would it be?
A. As a minister, the important thing is to grasp the strategic situation precisely and take it into deep consideration. South-North relations can be thought of on many levels. I do not interfere with the employees much beyond the reports in regards to the responsibilities, but I do think very much about strategic thought in regards to South-North relations. I see both the amount of time a minister gives to strategic judgments and also whether he appropriately manages his employees as the most important points. It is a question of putting people in appropriate positions, and using people at the appropriate time - that is, for example, when a situation develops, deciding how to combine people from our department with officials from various branches of the government to form a team and then carry on a correspondence. One must know how to mobilize these resources and how to assign them. I think that this is an important virtue. That's what comes to mind right now.
Q. What basic principles do you hold in terms of South-North relations in your capacity as Minister?
A. Just as the president says, if there is no structure of trust, can there be any mutual confidence among the parties? The basics of trust are in whether or not promises are kept, and in whether or not they are kept secret or leaked. I see trust as the most important factor. I also see justification as being very important. That's why every time I talk to North Koreans, I request non-stop that they give me some justification to act. I let them know how much money I control in the Fund for South-North Exchange and Cooperation, and I tell them that in order to use it on their behalf, I need a decent justification that I can present before the taxpaying South Korean people so that they can see that it is being well spent. I must find projects that the South Korean people will agree to and that the North Korean side will undertake - but in order to do this, I think that the important thing is the justification presented to the people. I am also presenting to the North some elements of strategy. That's why when I deal with the North Korean issue, I often think in terms of justification and legitimacy. What our people want is not related to giving more or less to North Korea, but rather, was it given properly and was our honor damaged in the process, and that's why I think of these two things. Resolving the issues of North Korean refugees is of course a national obligation, but it is also a way of showing to the people the trust built with North Korea and showing justification to the people. That's why I ask for justifications from North Korea. I don't know how much they will give me, but that's another story.
Q. As a minister, is there anything that you would throw your job on the line for, or something in regards to which you could not compromise for which you would quit your position?
A. At this point, I suppose that would be stopping production at the Kaesung Industrial Complex. Isn't that something for which I should take responsibility for due to my position? In five to ten years the reason for building the Kaesung Industrial Plant will be evaluated. The fact that it continues uninterrupted is, to me, a symbol of peace. I went to the market in Dongdaemun [Seoul] for no other reason. There are 10,000 sewing factories there. But these people have no place to go. In the first stage at Kaesung Industrial Complex, we are making apartment-type factories, with some 50,000 pyung of space. If one factory has an area of 200 pyung, then we can fit more than 200 factories there. Although only 200 of the 10,000 factories are going there, if they move in and make a profit then it meets the demands of the market. That is what I will put myself on the line for. North Korea will also draw some benefit from it. That is why I hope to protect the Kaesung Industrial Complex enterprise at all costs.
Q. When you visited the Kaesung Industrial Complex on May 9, you said in your exhortation speech that "production at Kaesung Industrial Plant must not stop" and it seems that you are still speaking in very urgent terms on the matter. Is there any specific reason for this?
A. More than feeling a sense of urgency about this, I think that this enterprise must be completed without delay. Kaesung Industrial Plant must not be stopped, and I feel a strong certainty that it won't be stopped. I have thought about this matter as well - so long as there is no extreme situation such as a war, no matter what happens the plant must be made to function. I think that it is important that society reach a sort of consensus on this point. I don't mean in American or Chinese society - I mean in our very own society. Fortunately, a fair amount of consensus has built up within our society. As a minister, I must take responsibility and respond to the consensus. In fact, Kaesung Industrial Complex is not in a situation now where it can be stopped. Moreover, if businesses enter and if there is no war, then it will proceed. As I think that it is only if this succeeds that South Korea will thrive and the Korean people's future will come alive, I will throw every muscle into preventing any distraction or serious situation from emerging. This is the desparate situation that I speak of.
Q. Was the Kaesung Industrial Complex started by a minister? What caused it to come about?
A. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, honorary chairman of the Hyundai Group, Chung
Choo-young started it, and the initiation of construction was in June of 2003. President Kim Dae-jung strongly wished to see the ground to be broken for the Kaesong Industrial Complex during his tenure.
Q. What sort of efforts are you normally making on behalf of the Kaesung Industrial Plant?
A. When I was in the National Security Council I went to the U.S. Department of Commerce to seek an agreement in regards to export control items and thus beforehand I made a set of talking points on how to convince the Americans of the project. Minister Chung Dong-yung also went and spoke with them. I am still directly providing oversight to the Kaesung Industrial Complex. I directly manage central issues in regards to the Kaesung Industrial Complex.
Q. On 17 December during the ministerial summit, it was agreed that stages one and two be launched simultaneously, yet when Kaesung Industrial Complex(KIC) Project Support Leader Ko Kyung-bin visited the U.S. recently, he said that the progress of stage two was dependent on progress in regards to the North Korea nuclear issue. Can one thus say that the development plans in regard to Kaesung Industrial Park have changed?
A. I think that the second stage of production must be carried out, but from the position of this administration, finishing stage one first is important. If the second stage becomes an issue, then at least the first stage should be finished so that some 60,000 to 70,000 North Korean workers may work there, and once this structure is in place we have to move onto the next stage. The first stage alone covers a huge area of some 1,000,000 pyung, so the first thing we need to do is to set that stage straight.
Q. One might say that the supply of human resources is the most important factor.
A. Labor power becomes an issue from the very first stage. That is why we are consistently asking North Korea for plans in regards to the supply of a labor force. While there is the issue of safety and order, at this point the factor impeding us is the labor supply. That is why the first stage must be completed with certainty.
Q: Apart from labor force supply, what other factors should be considered?
A: We have to consider the supply of a sufficient workforce and deal with new developments in a flexible manner. It would be impossible to stop factories already in operation, but as for a new one still in developmental stage, there is nothing we can do if North Korea says it is going to stop it. So, the way we should do is to build the industrial park quickly so that we can retain those 60,000 to 70,000 workers.
That is why we are keenly focusing on the first phase of the KIC development project. While the second phase will unfold as planned, in the meantime we are making an all-out effort for the first phase to materialize. In that case, the labor force currently available in Gaesong wouldn’t be enough. If we are in control of all manpower supply and everything is secure, then we can go ahead with both phases hand in hand. However, for now, we need to make a phased progress.
Q: What kind of efforts are you putting in to make Washington have a more favorable view on the GIC project?
A: We are making efforts to arrange visits by some prominent Washington figures to the North complex. Some already visited there. Besides, my ministry’s personnel who are involved in the KIC project went over to the U.S. and explained it at various forums and governmental consultations.
There is also possibility that those people who want to enter the Kaesong industrial park might present their perspectives to the U.S. because they are quite upset about the recent comment by Jay Lefkowitz, the U.S. special envoy for North Korean human rights.
Q: How many South Korean companies want to move in to the KIC zone?
A: A lot. As of today, there are about 2,000 of them. There is not enough space for all of them. I think the competition is about 10: 1. It seems small and medium-sized enterprises especially favor the KIC.
Q: To change the subject a bit, there are some areas where Seoul’s policy toward Pyongyang is not aligned with its policy toward Washington. What is your view on that?
A: I believe the R.O.K.-U.S. alliance will advance firmly in a comprehensive manner. The free-trade agreement is good evidence for this. However, I also believe that, in the area of defense, South Korea had better overcome its heavy dependency on America. And in the process of achieving this goal in a mutually beneficial and balanced manner, there is one area where we differ: North Korea. The two countries have no difference in other issues.
But then, you know it is impossible for Seoul and Washington to agree in all areas and on all issues. The Korean peninsula has its special geographical position and the U.S. has its global strategy. In the areas where we disagree, as long as these are not vital matters on which hangs the very fate of the nation, then we should respect the other’s positions.
The human rights issue is a good example. We don’t raise the U.S. human rights issue and we work with the U.S. on the North Korean nuclear crisis.
Some people worry that the North Korean human rights and nuclear issues are moving more toward Seoul in view of it. Actually, in many issues, Seoul agrees with Washington’s views. Yet on matters related to the Korean Peninsula, I believe the U.S. should also be able to go with Seoul’s view. I think this is what ’alliance’ means. If one side leads all the time and decides all the time, then we wouldn’t need such alliance.
We know more about the Korean Peninsula than the U.S., and we have more understanding about it than the U.S. But when there is a difference of opinion between Seoul and Washington, very few South Korean media and civic groups would say that Washington should give support to Seoul. I don’t think this is the correct definition of alliance.
Although there are some areas where the two sides differ in their positions, in the most critical issue, i.e., the North Korean nuclear crisis, we have been forming a common front. Yet since there are some different voices within the Bush administration on North Korea, we are waiting for those differences in Washington to settle down. On our part, we want a peaceful resolution of the nuclear standoff and oppose any outside attempt to topple the North’s regime.
I hope North Korea will transform into a more open society through economic development. I believe Washington will join us to support it. If not, we should make it happen. This is the kind of mindset we need. I am not sure whether I, as Unification Minister should say this but, I am a bit frustrated that some Koreans are too accustomed to a life in which we depend on others.
Q: What is your take on the East Asian issue in relation to North Korea’s nuclear crisis?
A: The North’s nuclear issue is a crisis, but it is also an opportunity. I hope under the Six-party framework we can resolve the nuclear issue, and also wish that the Six-party framework could develop into a regime even after the nuclear issue becomes settled so that it can lead to the discussion of East Asian peace.
Ironically, through the North Korean nuclear standoff, the future East Asia security blueprints in the minds of the powerful nations were revealed a bit. I think we found out that actually each country, including South Korea, China and Russia, is more or less on the same page. The same can be said about Japan. The mainstream thinking in Washington does not differ much, either.
Then, if we can make the six-party talks successful, it will be a great asset as well as a learning lesson for us to advance the East Asian peace discussion and eventual peace settlement. That’s why it is important to continue to develop the six-party framework further, created by the North Korean nuclear standoff. The other relevant countries feel the same way.
Q: China and Japan seem to heading towards cooperation in some areas. Given that new development, what should be South Korea’s strategic choice?
A: When I meet with American officials, I tell them that we attach a great importance to the R.O.K.-U.S. alliance because it is what gives us more leverage in our growing trade and cooperation with neighboring nations and earn more respect from them. In other words, South Korea’s alliance with the United States, which does not have any territorial ambition on the Korean Peninsula, is one of the reasons that Seoul can earn its respect from neighboring countries. This benefits South Korea.
Then I also tell the Americans that the R.O.K.-U.S. union is also good for the United Sates. While the U.S.-Japan alliance is based on keeping China at bay and America’s purpose of having it is to manage the confrontation and conflicts in the East Asia, the Seoul-Washington alliance is based on the Korean Peninsula’s strategic uniqueness.
Therefore, South Korea cannot agree with any strategy that excludes China. An East Asian strategy that includes China can pave the way for integration and cooperation. In that process, the R.O.K.-U.S. alliance plays the most important role.
In other words, the R.O.K.-U.S. alliance is not only beneficial to Seoul, but is also propitious to Washington. Although the U.S.-Japan alliance is also important, it has some limitations. I strongly believe this. My point is that we should respect each other.
Q: You are roughly implying that Washington should work on more toward the R.O.K.-U.S. cooperation?
A: The ultimate U.S. national interest is to win over China. For the time being, there are different voices in Washington and things are a bit snarled. But eventually I believe Washington will return to its own coherent stance.
Q: In the past, the status of the Ministry of Unification was lower than that of the National Security Agency (NSA). Its system was weak and didn’t have much information on North Korea. Have there been any changes?
A: The weakening role of the NSA does not necessarily mean strengthening of the role of the Unification Ministry. Since I took the charge of the Unification Ministry, I have spent a considerable effort to build an information-sharing mechanism with other governmental agencies. In the Foreign Ministry’s mission chiefs meeting, for example, I requested them to send over to my ministry every single copy of documents that contain "North Korea" in them.
I probably ran some 100 errands to make it realized. And I checked it everyday because unless I did so, it wouldn’t become a standard procedure, and it would be difficult for information to flow from the Foreign Ministry to the Unification Ministry.
I also told the Information & Analysis Bureau of my ministry not to compete with the NSA and instead encouraged them to produce policy information. And then, I required two difficult tasks from them. One is to share intelligence with as many individuals as possible who need it; the other is to maintain its security.
To become an effective ministry, employees’ capacity-building is very important. Even if information is shared, if employees don’t have the ability to process that information, then it is useless.
Now, we don’t have an in-person reporting system. Instead, we use an electronic approval system that includes information about who was consulted and comments from relevant bureaus along the line. This electronic approval system is to break the barriers between people and to engage in a productive discussion.
My approval waiting period doesn’t go beyond two days, and all reports are marked as Normal Reference, Essential, and Waiting for Further Instruction. I think I have about ten Normal Reference coming to me these days.
Q: Where did you come up with the idea?
A: I got it from the President. The Presidential office used it and I borrowed it. Now if you look at the document management file, you can tell the policy system, policy quality and originator. It even includes who the originator consulted and when they were consulted in writing up the policy. As a minister, I have only limited authority and political influence. Even if a minister has enough authority and influence, his ministry may only remain powerful while he is in power.
What is essential to become an effective ministry is to equip itself with internal capacity and capable individuals. In other words, the Unification Ministry should have a few very adept individuals who can represent the ministry. My goal is to leave behind a ministry, which remains effective regardless of whoever takes over from me. For that to be possible, the people inside the ministry should build their own capacity.
Q: Do you still meet Americans often when your ministry is engaged in inter-Korean relations?
A: It’s impossible not to meet them because there are many of them who want to see me. They come to me because of the KIC project, the North Korean nuclear issue and inter-Korean relations. They are particularly interested in the Kaesong consortium. So, when I meet them, I give them a watch, branded the "Unification Watch," made by Romanson Co. in Kaesong as a gift. (end)
