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The all too modest Ministry of National Defense The hubbub over the report happened two years ago. In so doing, it was demonstrated that the North’s military force had been overestimated, and the South’s underestimated. To this, the conservative media clamored that "the South Korean military power remains inferior" and the Armed Forces exclaimed that the North had "strengthened itself militarily via the importation of high-tech weaponry." But one government official countered that, "the Ministry of National Defense is being too modest." So long as no danger presents itself, the Ministry of National Defense should work to reassure the people. So why would the ministry purposely lower their self-evaluation? Professor Ham Taek-yeong of the North Korean Studies Graduate Program at Kyeongnam University and Professor Suh Jae-jung of Cornell University stated in their article on the balance between North and South Korean military power that there was an intentional bias in the South’s evaluation of the North’s military. This bias, they argued, arises from the concern that if the South Korean military were deemed to be superior, then budgeting for national defense would be decreased, thus leading inevitably to the discussion of troop reduction. The issue of North Korea’s military superiority lurks in the backdrop of this summer’s fierce debate regarding the issue of transferring the right of wartime operational control from the U.S. to South Korea. Those who oppose the transfer of the control argue that with the South Korean military being inferior to the North Korean military, to transfer authority now could make U.S. aid harder to come by or mean the ultimate withdrawal of U.S. forces stationed in Korea. While trying to ease these concerns, the Ministry of National Defense has responded that it will prepare for the transfer of authority by strengthening the military. Though at first glance the two sides of this debate seem to hold different views, they both agree on the basic necessity of building up South Korea’s armed forces. One government official said, "if our troops are evaluated to be superior to those of the North, it becomes possible to discuss whether or not U.S. Forces Korea are truly necessary. Thus, those who maintain that U.S. Forces Korea is necessary do so to prevent a self-contradiction from arising." The comparison of Northern and Southern military capability is important not only in terms of the transfer of wartime operational control, but also in regards to the process of developing a peaceful regime on the Korean peninsula. Is the several-decades-old idea of Northern superiority myth or reality? Former president Kim Dae-jung’s eldest son, Democratic Party representative Kim Hong-il, polled 2,054 adults on "whether the South Korean military power was stronger than that of the North if American forces are taken out of the equation." To this, 40.5 percent replied that the North was superior, 28.7 percent gave the advantage to the South, and 25 percent deemed the two sides to be equal. In particular, those in their forties and fifties saw the Northern military as being superior. The survey had a margin of error of ± 2.16 percentage points. Professor Ham Taek-yeong described the belief held by the plurality of people that the North is superior as "an erroneous myth." In any case, it is necessary to take a concrete look at North-South military power. Let us recall a time 18 years prior. In the 1988 National Defense White Papers, South Korea’s conventional military strength index was evaluated as being 65 percent of that of North Korea. Liberal activist and one-time professor Lee Young Hee conducted the first independent, verifiable and analytical analysis of the comparative North-South military strength in the same year. Lee stated in his article "Comparative Research on North-South Combat Capabilities" that, with U.S. Forces Korea and nuclear weapons removed from the equation, the South and North were on overall equal footing militarily. Furthermore, he argued, "If one comprehensively analyzes the ability to conduct warfare, including such factors as personnel resources and mobilization capabilities, the GNP to support a drawn-out war, and economic mobilization, then the South is clearly leaps and bounds ahead of the North. Perhaps under some influence from these findings, the National Defense White Papers released two years later stated that in comprehensively analyzing the military strength of the two countries, South Korea was superior in terms of the potential power to conduct a war, the two were fairly equal in terms of troop mobilization, and that the North was stronger in regards to the strength of its standing armies. The papers continued to assert that in view of the growth trend of South Korean military power, if an appropriate level of defense expenditures were maintained, a balance of power would be ensured. Overestimate the enemy, underestimate thyself In his 1990 book, "The Half-Century Myth," Lee pointed out line-by-line the deceptions presented by the American and South Korean authorities in regards to the North’s military superiority. He unearthed statistics in military white papers that said that from 1988 to 1990, South Korea manufactured only 200 field artillery pieces and not a single tank or armored personnel carrier, whereas North Korea was surmised to have built hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers in addition to thousands of artillery pieces. Judging from the fact that over that time period South Korea spent more than 5 trillion won on national defense military investments alone, it is hard to believe the 2004 white papers found no new weapons of note to have been built during that time. Lee concluded that the South Korean Air Force was far superior to their Northern counterparts if one considered that despite the North’s seeming numerical superiority in airpower, more than half of their aircraft are antiquated MIG-17s dating from the Korean War, and that the MIG-19s imported since 1955 had deteriorated with time’s passage. It is well known that when requesting military funding from the Congress, the U.S. government evaluated Soviet expenditures as rising and downplayed its own strength as a tactic of emphasizing the threat of Soviet military superiority. Ri suggested that Korean authorities, too, had fallen into this form of logic. Sixteen years hence, and how have things changed? The Ministry of National Defense has thrown a whopping 80 trillion won into development of national defense from 1990 to 2006, which made up 20 to 30 percent of the defense budget every year. Though the figure was lower in North Korean reports, in 2003 it used US$5 billion of its 11.2 billion dollar budget to cover all of its national defense expenditures. Even North Korea’s national budget fails to reach South Korea’s military budget alone over this 16-year period. South Korea’s economy is 30 times the scale of that of its Northern counterpart. Yet, despite this, a classified Ministry of National Defense document evaluated the South’s deterrent force in relation with the North as being 101 percent for air forces, 94 percent for naval forces, and 80 percent for ground forces. These are almost the same results quoted earlier from the Institute for Defense Analyses. Representative Im Jong-in has taken the lead in the criticism, declaring that "the greatest mystery is in the Ministry of National Defense’s explanation of our military power. In 1980 and 1990, the Ministry of National Defense said our military was [still] 80 percent as strong as that of the North, and even now they are saying our ground forces are 80 percent, our navy is 90 percent, and our air forces are 103 percent as strong. If that’s the case, where has the 68 trillion Won invested in armaments since 1975 gone?" Following in Professor Lee’s footsteps, Professors Ham Taek-yeong and Suh Jae-jung adapted the method of comparing military capital to demonstrate the speciousness of North Korea’s alleged superiorty. As a result, unlike the government’s assertion, South Korea secured military superiority during the 1980s, and the gap between North and South has grown progressively wider ever since. The Institute for International Strategic Studies in 1983 evaluated Southern defense spending of 4.4 billion dollars as extensively surpassing that of the North’s 1.9 billion dollars. In 1999, they pronounced that South Korea’s ability to carry out warfare surpassed that of the North by 203 to 331 percent. There is room for difference in comparisons of Northern and Southern military power, depending on the object of analysis and the methodology used. The problem is that it is impossible to substantiate the process by which the government produces its statistics, as it is regarded as secret. The office of representative Kim Hong-il, in response to the public opinion poll, suggested that "as a comparison of military strength is not something on which Korean people can gain precise information, they only make estimates, and thus I think that the appropriate government organs should publicize this information." A majority of specialists agrees that as a result of no one being able to inspect the North Korean military firsthand, its strength has been exaggerated. Of course, one must not underestimate the North militarily, but it is also dangerous to overestimate it, as doing so leads to a swelling in military expenditures. N.K. missiles as a reaction to S.K. military spending Constant military buildup can bring about adverse reactions, as one side’s unilateral buildup can lead to an arms race. "With the advent of the ’90s, North Korea could no longer compete with the South in terms of conventional military forces, leaving them with the sole of option of finding a cheaper alternative," Professor Sung said. "Thus, the North turned their energies to the dual development of both conventional and non-conventional deterrent forces in the form of long range artillery pieces and payload missiles capable of hitting Seoul." North Korea is struggling to maintain a balance of power, if only through holding a single asymmetrical advantage. For this reason, South Korea must strive first and foremost for accuracy in determining the North’s military strength. After all, the Ministry of National Defense holds no plans for a pre-emptive strike on the North. Fundamentally, the goal is to deter Northern aggression and intimidation. However, without appropriate analyses of the Northern military, a Southern arms buildup will press on like runaway train. As Lee Young Hee once said, "It is all to clear that only through the symmetric decrease of military forces can war and the reckless squandering of resources be prevented." This article was written by Ryu Yigeun for the weekly magazine Hankyoreh21 and translated by Daniel Rakove.
