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Q. Before [your article appeared], I saw no serious attempt on your part to take such a critical stance. A. I realized early on that due to the [Roh administration’s] social structural limitations, in the end it could only take the country in a direction different from that which I had hoped for. Q. In that case, shouldn’t you have unsheathed the blade of criticism earlier? A. I still held the hope that things would improve if [the administration’s policies] changed after I met [the president] and talked with him, but I became very pessimistic afterwards. [At the beginning of Roh’s term] there were those who earnestly requested that I work on behalf of the Presidential Committee on the Northeast Asia Cooperation Initiative, but I resigned from being [a memeber of the committee] before even one year had passed. Looking at the methods of governance and of determining policy, I came to the conclusion that it was in no way the place for me. Later, a new situation emerged with the impeachment [of the president], but I had already given up and gone abroad. [In the year following the launch of the Participatory Government, Professor You took a year of sabbatical lecturing at Beijing University and the University of California.] In regards to why he held back on criticizing the Participatory Government, Professor You said that he feared that people would take his criticism as "sour grapes coming from a man estranged after being unable to complete the job assigned to him." The occasion for his change in approach came after Roh’s proposal for a grand alliance with the opposition Grand National Party (GNP). A. After the proposal for a grand alliance, I thought to myself, ’The Roh administration has gone as far as it can go, and now is the time to write.’ The grand alliance proposal was similar in nature to Roh’s controversial acceptance of the GNP-proposed special prosecutor to investigate former president Kim Dae-jung’s bribe to North Korea. [Here Professor You refers to money that was given to the North prior to the 2000 North-South summit. The Uri Party - Roh’s party - argued to no avail that the incident be investigated instead via the preexisting system.] President Roh’s sole interest was to create a support base in Yeongnam [a conservative region of Korea], and his decision was completely bereft of ideology. When Roh asked, ’What is the difference between the Uri Party and the GNP?’ I decided to take up my pen, submitting an article entitled "Bipolarization" for the December issue of the Shindonga magazine. The article was the product of personal feelings and a promise that I had made. After that, the issue of the U.S.-South Korea free trade agreement came to the fore. As this is a decision on which we do not get a second shot, I decided it was urgent that I speak out in the hope that - in spite of my inability - I could raise some important issues. Q. Why do you view the South Korea-U.S. FTA as such an important issue? A. [Because] it is thick with the possibility that it will worsen South Korea-U.S. relations. Q. That sounds somewhat surprising. A. Whether in medical, financial, or automotive fields, if one explores each of these fields concretely, it is clear that those involved are increasingly feeling the acuteness of the infringement on their interest. Thus, people that generally feel that ’it is not all that great to try to get along with America’ will gradually increase in number. At first, it was only farmers and filmmakers who felt that way, but... Q. However, isn’t it true that the perception is on the rise that only with market liberalization can a sound economic structure emerge [in South Korea]? A. There is much to gain for America in a South Korea-U.S. FTA. Whether selling more agricultural products such as beef, rice, and beans, or in marketing movies, they will carry away tangible profits. They will also take in a lot of royalties through intellectual property rights... But from the Korean perspective, no matter how one looks at it, there is nothing [additional to be gained]. Take the automobile as a representative example of an export product. They are already being manufactured in America, and there is the problem of foreign cars finding a greater share of the domestic market. The tariff rate is already low as it is. There is also no possibility that American trade measures, such as safeguards or regulations in regards to the origin of textiles, will change. There is very little that [Korea] can gain through the expansion of trade. Even government researchers forecast that imports from America will by far increase the most. Professor You suggested that "with the asymmetrical results of the treaty, anti-American sentiment based on the assertion that America is craftily making away [with Korean money] will lead to stronger anti-Americanism." He continued, "the negotiations may break up due to the opposition of public opinion, and even if there is some sort of compromise, in regard to the unacceptable provisions an opposition will emerge no less fierce than that witnessed in the June 10, 1987 struggle. [On that date, over one million people took to the streets in a rally for democracy.] In that case, it will be difficult for the National Assembly to ratify the bill, and U.S.-South Korean relations will suffer as a result." Q. Considering that the mainstream [conservative] media is leading the effort in favor of a South Korea-U.S. FTA, is it not a stretch to forecast a worsening of US-South Korean relations? Furthermore, as the Uri Party was the one to put forward an FTA, thus aligning themselves with the GNP, the assertion that the agreement will fail does not seem valid. A. Public opinion is already split in half. No - on second thought, more than half of public opinion is already in opposition [to the FTA]. If the debate dies down, public support will gradually rise, but things will be different with the treaty’s progression and the resulting conflict. Just as seen in the 2002 incident [in which two Korean schoolgirls died as a result of being accidentally run over by an American armored personnel carrier] here, too, are the potential makings of anti-American sentiment. Furthermore, the GNP is not looking for a fight on this issue. Why would they choose to take the lead when public opinion stands so strongly in opposition? ...The Uri Party must be the one to take the lead, but then the party will be divided. As the presidential election nears, the Uri Party will inevitably grow distant from the president. If it is uncovered in the process that there are problems in the results of the treaty, the Uri Party will be unable to ignore the fact that the majority of people oppose the treaty. It is simple logic that if public opinion [against the FTA] passes the 50-percent threshold, the [legislators] can but only oppose the treaty’s ratification. Presidential hopefuls will be forced to do the same. If by good fate the poisonous provisions are dropped and a limited FTA is agreed upon, then there will be little problem, but... Q. How do you foresee the U.S.-South Korea FTA progressing? A. It will be strongly influenced by the opposition movement. Things have already changed a lot. Even now, the government is making haste, but with the domestic opposition, the U.S. and South Korean governments both realize that they cannot recklessly conclude this agreement. The results of the treaty are anything but set in stone. The negotiating team’s strategy and attitude are strongly subject to outside influence, and there is always public opinion - that is a big force. Even so, in the end, I foresee the final draft as largely reflecting American demands. Q. The question as to why President Roh is pursuing a South Korea-U.S. FTA has been with us for some time now, but there is still no satisfactory answer to this. A. I do not want to speculate on that. That said, perhaps it was because he has not achieved anything? The tenure of this administration has all but ended, and out comes their ’Vision 2030’ [a blueprint for South Korea in 2030]... It would appear that, having failed to accomplish anything, the psychology of wanting to pull off something big is taking shape. Q. Since you brought it up, I would like to ask your opinion on ’Vision 2030.’ A. According to the stages of development proposed, innovation leading to the accumulation of capital is the correct course [to promote]. However, the pathetic thing is that this course was in place from the beginning. At this point, as the Roh administration nears its end, policies have to be pursued. It is not the time to be putting forth a vision. What makes it all the more nonsensical is that, to date, there is no plan for practical implementation. If we are to promote innovation-led growth and pursue public welfare, at some point taxes must be raised, but there is neither the will nor ability to do so. Rather, there is a critical lack of resolve. Q. Do you see the Participatory Government and the Uri Party’s descent into unpopularity as a product of external conditions or as rather emerging from the weakness of the reform movement itself? A. This isn’t the sort of thing to which one can numerically assign percentages, but seen in the big picture, it is a structural problem. Q. You mean to say that regardless of the one holding power, reform is a difficult feat? A. That’s not what I’m saying... The way I see things, if a ’decently’ prepared political party supports reform and if ’decent’ people support the reform measures, as well, then much progress can be carried out. While it is true that there is structural difficulty faced in carrying out reform, the party in power is pathetic beyond belief. The quality of this president, his staff... With this point, Professor You let loose a string of barbed, trenchant criticism of the Roh administration. "I said as much at the birth of the Uri Party - that it was just another bubble party that would burst before long. Why, you ask? They lack an identity. It’s a party that was thrown together before the election - a hodgepodge party without a direction to pull the country toward. I said that, in the end, it was merely a fly-by-night party formed under the direction of a power holder [Roh]. Reform cannot take place with a party like the Uri Party in power. When they received a ’death sentence’ in the May 31 local elections, the first words out of their mouths was the easing of real estate taxes. What a bunch of utter dimwits. They have no idea as to what their support base is thinking and feeling. Rather, they came up with those ideas through their association with their upper-class friends. The Uri Party was, from the beginning, a party not organized around a given set of policies. Seventy percent are opportunists, 10 percent are boneheads, and a mere 20 percent of them are not so bad by comparison." Q. Your criticism can be read as a sign that you still hold some affection [toward the Participatory Government,] but do you think that there is room for them to improve? A. Even if I thought there was no space to improve, I can still write. I’ve given my fair share of criticism, but the questions that I have fixed upon most are, ’How did things come to this?’ and, ’What can we learn from this failure to achieve democratic development and desirable economic reform?’ In reviewing the points one by one, we are learning lessons. As a citizen, I still hope that the [Participatory Government] will fight the good fight, ably manage the economy, and make a mid-course correction, but I realize that these hopes are dubious. Individually speaking, I see the probability [of improvement] as being less than 0.01 percent. At this point, Professor You repeated that, "the Uri Party is hopeless, and if [reform is to be achieved], a different organization reflecting the politics of the people must take shape," further adding that a "policy-centered party" was important [as a tool of carrying out reform]. When asked if he knew of anyone who was making the necessary preparations, he responded, "of course I do, but of this matter I will say nothing further." This article was written by reporter Kim Yeong-bae and translated by Daniel Rakove.
