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DSC Commander Lee Seok-gu responds to inquiries concerning the martial law document at a plenary session of the National Defense Committee on July 24. Minister of National Defense Song Young-moo listens in the forefront. (Yonhap News)
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Reminiscent of military efforts to receive Washington’s approval of 1961 and 1980 coups
The possibility of martial law in South Korean being recognized by the US was considered in a 67-page document titled “Specifics of the Contingency Plan” drafted early last year by the Defense Security Command (DSC). The document was also found to contain numerous suggestions reminiscent of the 1980 seizure of power by the so-called “New Military Group” of Chun Doo-hwan, including calls for the flagrante delicto arrest of National Assembly members and institution of emergency martial law nationwide. The details came to light on July 23 when the Ministry of National Defense submitted the document as “plain text” to the National Assembly National Defense Committee. Appearing before the committee on July 24, vice minister of national defense Suh Choo-suk explained the background behind the document’s submission to the National Assembly. “At a security policy review committee meeting yesterday, we concluded that even though the document was stamped as a ‘Class 2 military secret,’ it was not even registered and did not meet the conditions for confidentiality,” he said. `The DSC documented listed “measures at the time of martial law declaration” under a category titled “intensified diplomatic activities with military officer groups and the foreign press in South Korea,” suggesting “inviting the Secretary [of Defense] and US Ambassador to South Korea to [enlist] cooperation in having the martial law recognized in the US.“ The document also called for the martial law commander to “summon military officers in South Korea to [explain about] the unavoidability of martial law and ask for their support in its implementation, including the swift establishment of social order,” and for the Minister of Foreign Affairs to “invite local envoys from major countries (including journalists and business figures) to request their support for martial law implementation.” The content is reminiscent of the diplomatic efforts by the South Korean government to receive recognition from the US at the time of the coup d’état of May 16, 1961, and the nationwide emergency martial law declaration in May 1980. Measures devised to paralyze National Assembly Measures were also carefully devised to prevent the National Assembly from having the state of martial law lifted. Article 77 of the Constitution states that the National Assembly must be notified without delay when the President declares martial law, and mandates the President shall comply when a majority of the total members of the National Assembly agree to demand that it be lifted. Describing the National Assembly at the time as consisting of “around 160 progressive-leaning lawmakers and 130 conservative-leaning lawmakers out of 299,” the document expresses concern about “the possibility of martial law being lifted due to the ruling party’s minority status.” As a response, it stressed the need to “employ the ruling party to ensure that National Assembly members do not participate in a vote to lift martial law,” and to “consider foreclosing” the possibility of the then-Speaker, Democratic Party lawmaker Chung Sye-kyun, exercising his authority to raise a motion to demand its lifting. Article 13 of the Martial Law Act states, “During the enforcement of martial law, no member of the National Assembly shall be arrested or detained except in case of flagrante delicto.” In response, the document suggests “applying judicial treatment of flagrante delicto to induce a failure to meet a quorum for voting,” while stressing the “need for countermeasures through party-government consultation to prevent ex officio raising of and voting on a motion to lift martial law.” The DSC document further proposes the pursuit of martial law through a “Ministry of National Defense emergency countermeasures committee.” The committee, which lacks any legal basis, would have been presided over by the Minister of National Defense and consisted of a minimal membership including the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, Army Chief of Staff, DSC commander, special forces commander, and Capital Defense Command commander; listed as chief agenda items were the question of whether to implement martial law, the type of martial law and region(s) of implementation, and recommendations for the martial law commander. In particular, the document stresses the importance of maintaining security prior to martial law declaration, noting the failure of martial law forces in Turkey to suppress a citizens’ rebellion in July 2016. Priority consideration of “nationwide martial law” Categorizing martial law into “security,” “emergency,” “regional,” and “nationwide” types, the document states that “declaration of nationwide martial law should be given priority consideration” to restore social order swiftly. Article 6 of the Martial Law Act states that in the case of nationwide martial law, the martial commander is to be subject to instructions and supervision directly from the President, bypassing the Minister of National Defense – a signal of the intensified standing and authority of the martial law forces. In the events of 1980, the New Military Group ruthlessly suppressed the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement and seized power after emergency martial law was extended nationwide apart from Jeju Island on May 17. The document further included examples of the martial law declaration made in the name of acting President Choi Kyu-hah immediately after the assassination of Park Chung-hee on Oct. 27, 1979, along with a decree in the name of martial law commander Jeong Seung-hwa, suggesting that they should be used as references for the martial law declaration, statement, and decree texts to be used when declaring martial law. Measures were also devised to control the administration, with the martial law command to dispatch two “martial law coordinators” at the field officer level to each government ministry, which in turn was to summon two government employees each at Level 5 or higher to the martial law command. The plan also called for the deputy martial law commander to preside over a meeting of vice ministers. By Park Byong-su, senior staff writer Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]
