 |
|
The South Korean military test launches the ballistic missile Hyunmoo-2 in response to a series of North Korean test launches on Sept. 15, 2017. There are disagreements concerning the accuracy of the Hyunmoo missile series and whether or not they’re suitable for striking North Korean missiles. (Yonhap News)
|
South Korea’s military could potentially undergo reform as inter-Korean cooperation progresses
The “plan B” that South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has drawn up as an alternative to the National Defense Reform 2.0 plan is based on the sense that changes to security policy will be inevitable when the possibility of North Korea causing a war on the Korean Peninsula vanishes. Whereas the current basic national defense plan – which can be called “plan A” – regards North Korea as the greatest security threat, Plan B presumes peaceful coexistence between South and North Korea and seeks to counter new threats around the Korean Peninsula, including the hegemonic rivalry between the US and China.
The current National Defense Reform 2.0 initiative was drawn up to respond to a situation in which North Korea’s conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, including its nuclear weapons, pose a high threat. If North Korea denuclearizes and South and North Korea reach a high degree of disarmament, this plan will inevitably become less logical and valid.
In a document about the current status of National Defense Reform 2.0 that the Hankyoreh acquired on Dec. 9, the South Korean government provides the following explanation about the need for a Plan B to serve as an alternative to Plan A: “If there is continuing progress on denuclearization and if inter-Korean relations continue to change, the current plan for the military’s structural development will inevitably have to be altered. Considering the difficulties and dangers inherent in ad-hoc alterations to huge military structural plans, there needs to be a separate plan that can be applied when denuclearization and the signing of a peace treaty become a reality.”
 |
|
Basic plan for military organization and "Plan B "
|
A source who is well-informed about the MND’s preparations for Plan B said that the key factor in converting to Plan B will be confirming the “irreversibility” of North Korea’s denuclearization.
“If North Korea destroyed key components used in developing nuclear weapons, for example, that would constitute the elimination of its ‘future nukes.’ When this and other such measures are taken, a time will come when a consensus forms that North Korea has given up an irrevocable amount of its nuclear program. When North Korea’s denuclearization becomes an imminent reality in this manner, it would be possible to consider a conversion to Plan B,” this source said.
Several conditions necessary before Plan B could be implemented
According to this source, several conditions would be necessary before the conversion could be made to Plan B. The North Korean threat would have to be reduced, South Korea would have to regain wartime operational control (OPCON) of its troops, and consequently South Korea’s armed forces would have to be stronger than they are at present. Other factors that could affect the conversion to Plan B are meaningful steps toward denuclearization by North Korea that could be verified by the US or the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) through inspections at the Yongbyon nuclear facility and the North’s disclosure of nuclear materials and facilities, along with improvement in North Korea-US relations, substantial progress on inter-Korean arms control, and public opinion.
Though the specifics of Plan B have yet to be determined, it’s expected to have much in common with Plan A, considering that Plan B is being drafted on the assumption that South Korea will maintain its alliance with the US and that American troops will remain on the Korean Peninsula.
“60 to 70% will remain the same as Plan A, while only about 30 to 40% will be different. Furthermore, some of those differences might be designed so as to be easily reversible,” said an official in the military.
“Since the Defense Ministry assumes the worst when it draws up plans, the people drafting Plan B won’t be wearing rose-colored glasses. The drafters have no choice but to consider what must be done to secure a certain level of military power and to achieve a public consensus,” this official added.
Even after the conversion is made to Plan B, it will take some time to achieve its objectives: anywhere from five to 15 years. According to the document about National Defense Reform 2.0, the MND believes that North Korea’s denuclearization will be completed and a peace treaty signed after Plan B has been initiated and during the process of achieving its objectives. By the time that Plan B is completed, the MND presumes, the US will have announced North Korea’s denuclearization; the North’s actual use of nuclear weapons will be constrained, though it will presumably retain a latent nuclear capability; and that South and North Korea will have achieved structural arms control that meaningfully reduces, limits and eliminates military capabilities.
Other expected developments are the OPCON handover, a partial reduction of the functions of the UN Command, the maintenance of the USFK Command, the redeployment or small-scale drawback of American troops on the Korean Peninsula, and a parallel command structure of ROK-US combined forces.
The potential threat of China
In the document, the MND said it expects the security environment in East Asia at the time of Plan B’s completion to be one in which “China’s influence in the region is increasing and the US’ attempts to counter that are intensifying.” The MND predicted that the US will maintain its alliances with South Korea and with Japan while China bolsters its military and deploys troops to key areas in the region.
Some of the debates that are likely to erupt during the conversion to Plan B are alterations to South Korean and US forces’ joint command system and structural changes in the armed forces. In terms of the arrangement of units and manpower, the document predicted there may be a debate about readjusting the size of the standing army (currently 618,000, to be adjusted to 500,000 by 2020), as well as about whether the conscription system should be maintained at all.
Although the MND presented the overall direction of National Defense Reform 2.0 to the Blue House on July 27, this did not contain any content about structural reforms of the military. This resulted from the perceived need to develop an alternative plan, such as Plan B, given the changing security conditions.
In October, the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KIDA) put together a task force to carry out a conceptual study of the future vision of national defense, and this task force has been working on the details of Plan B. The results of the task force’s study will be presented to South Korean President Moon Jae-in in three installments, with the first briefing on Dec. 20, the second in March and the third in June.
By Noh Ji-won, staff reporter
Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]
