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US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (right), South Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Kyung-hwa (center) and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono (left) speak at a joint press conference in Seoul on June 14 at South Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). (Lee Jong-keun, staff photographer)
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US Secretary of State reveals outline of Trump’s agenda for North Korea’s rapid denuclearization
June 14 was a busy day for US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, who had come to Northeast Asia to share the results of the North Korea-US summit in Singapore on June 12 with related countries and to discuss how they can cooperate with the implementation of the North Korea-US agreement. The US’s strategy and actions since the June 12 summit cannot be fully understood without taking a close look at the words and itinerary of Pompeo, who is regarded as one of Trump’s close confidantes. While visiting South Korea on the afternoon of June 13, Pompeo emphasized the historic opportunity that the North Korea-US summit had provided to establish a new relationship between the two countries and expressed his trust in North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Pompeo also outlined the timeframe for denuclearization that the US has set. Pompeo’s message included a commitment to resetting North Korea-US relations, an emphasis on trust in North Korea and a call for rapid denuclearization. This is a complete reversal from the US’s previous approach, which consisted solely of pressuring the North to denuclearize. The North Korea-US summit has given rise to a new attitude toward the North. During the press conference following his meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kano on June 14, for example, Pompeo stressed the significance of the North Korea-US summit, which he described as an “enormous historic opportunity for us to [. . .] fundamentally reshape the relationship between the United States and North Korea” and “a turning point in the US-North Korea relationship.” Implied timeline of denuclearization to be two and a half years During a meeting with American reporters at the Hilton Hotel in Seoul on the evening of June 13, Pompeo said that “not all of that work [negotiated with North Korea] appeared in the final document [the joint statement]” and expressed his hope that “major disarmament” would be achieved within “two and a half years.” This means that the US basically hopes to wrap up North Korea’s denuclearization before the end of Trump’s term in 2020 and that much that has been discussed with the North remains unpublished. Pompeo also emphasized during the joint press conference with Kang and Kono on the morning of June 14 that “We believe that Chairman Kim Jong-un understands the urgency of the timing of completing this denuclearization [and] that he understands that we must do this quickly.” But this was no ordinary appeal. “We envision a [. . .] North Korea that is fully integrated within the community of nations. Kim Jong-un indicated in Singapore that he shared that vision,” Pompeo noted, before saying, “We are eager to see him take the next steps to achieve it because the United States is ready for a new chapter in our history.” His remarks are faithful to the spirit of the section of the joint statement reached in Singapore on June 12 that says, “Mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” In response to the remarks Trump made during a press conference on June 12 regarding the suspension of South Korea-US joint military exercises, Pompeo explained that Trump’s intention was to create an opportunity for productive dialogue about North Korea’s denuclearization. In other words, the remarks are an American confidence-building measure aimed at promoting the North’s denuclearization. But Pompeo did not bring up this issue during his trilateral meeting with Kang and Kono on June 14. He was presumably attempting to quietly support South Korean President Moon Jae-in by nailing down the plan to halt joint exercises while North Korea-US negotiations are underway without riling up South Korea’s conservative establishment. Pompeo visited Seoul and Beijing directly after Singapore summit, but not Tokyo Pompeo’s itinerary also deserves analysis. From Singapore, he traveled straight to South Korea. During the two days from June 13 to 14, he paid a courtesy visit to President Moon, met with Kang, the South Korean Foreign Minister, and then held the trilateral meeting with Kang and Kono. And then on the afternoon of June 14, he traveled to Beijing, where he paid a courtesy call on Chinese President Xi Jinping and met with Chinese State Councilor Yang Jiechi, who is the member of the Politburo in charge of foreign affairs, along with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi. But Pompeo made no stop in Japan, despite describing the US alliance with that country as being “ironclad.” Japan is of secondary concern, which is why Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Kono had to visit South Korea to meet Pompeo. “The trilateral meeting of top diplomats was arranged at the persistent request of the Japanese. The concealed purpose of this meeting was to forestall a backlash from Japan,” said a source who is well-versed in foreign policy. In fact, Kono’s remarks during the joint press conference were deliberately and perceptibly different in tone from those of Pompeo and Kang. He mentioned the importance of North Korea taking “concrete steps to fulfill its commitment to denuclearization”; he noted that the “no security guarantees have been given yet” by the US; and he expressed Japan’s understanding that the “Japan-US security commitment and [the posture of] US forces in Japan [. . .] remain unchanged.” Such anachronistic behavior by Japan – which is out of sync with the rapid change in affairs on the Korean Peninsula this year, shifting from confrontation and conflict to peace and reconciliation – is another source of concern in the process of dismantling the Cold War alignment on the Korean Peninsula. By Lee Je-hun, senior staff writer Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]
