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A painting in front of the Blue House depicts South Korean President Moon Jae-in and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un shaking hands. (Yonhap News)
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Moon and the Blue House view Kim’s visit as major step in N. Korea-US talks
“We think the correct approach is for this to resolved in the sequence of a second North Korea-US summit followed by an end-of-war declaration and a reciprocal Seoul visit by Chairman Kim Jong-un.” This message to the press was shared by the Blue House in early October. The mood at the time was strongly optimistic, with speculation that a Pyongyang summit in September between Kim and South Korean President Moon Jae-in and a fourth North Korea visit by US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had opened up prospects for the political situation on the Korean Peninsula. But while he also predicted things would work out well, US President Donald Trump predicted in November that the second North Korea-US summit would only materialize by around “January or February.” Months have gone by without the high-level North Korea-US talks needed to prepare for that summit. That was the context behind the announcement on Nov. 30 that the leaders in Seoul and Washington had agreed in their summit that Kim’s reciprocal visit would provide additional momentum for joint efforts to establish peace on the Korean Peninsula. It represented a change in strategy – reflecting Moon’s strong commitment to breaking through the current deadlock and “priming the pump” for a second North Korea-US summit by moving the date of Kim’s visit up from what the two sides had initially planned. It takes two hands to clap – and Moon’s decision was not coordinated ahead of time with Kim. That explains why no response has yet been forthcoming from the North Korean leader. Indeed, current and former high-ranking South Korean officials agreed that the proposal to “Seoul visit first” is not an appealing option to Kim. Despite three summits to date, Seoul and Pyongyang have been unable to execute any large-scale economic cooperation projects because of powerful sanctions from the US. From Kim’s perspective, the ideal sequence of events would be one where the momentum from exchanging additional denuclearization measures for flexibility on sanctions at a second North Korea-US summit would be carried over into a promise to proceed with major economic cooperation efforts during his reciprocal visit to Seoul. Kim’s silence not necessarily rejection Kim’s silence is not necessarily a signal of rejection. To begin with, a second North Korea-US summit represents an unmissable window of opportunity from his perspective. “Kim Jong-un is going to want to do whatever it takes to make a second North Korea-US summit happen, and President Trump has yet to execute any of the important policy decisions he has said he was ‘going to make,’” noted a high-ranking official in the areas of foreign affairs and national security. This goes some way in explaining why former and current high-ranking South Korean officials agree the second summit is certain to happen one way or another. The decision from Kim appears likely to come after intelligence on the South Korea-US and US-China summits has been gathered and analyzed. The big issue is that the South Korean and US leaders’ announcement about keeping sanctions in place until complete denuclearization has been achieved. Also, Trump’s remarks about reaching an agreement with Chinese President Xi Jinping on “100% cooperation” on the North Korea issue is a message that Kim wants to hear. It’s a situation that explains why he has been so reticent about responding. Kim’s focus is likely to be on figuring out some way of getting Trump to make a decisive move in terms of loosening sanctions. Current and former high-ranking South Korean officials agreed that the only option available to him lies in additional denuclearization measures. The question of what sorts of North Korea-related discussions and messages were shared during the South Korea-US and US-China summit – but not made public – is an important one for Kim, who has voiced his hopes for the “conditions to take shape that make me feel that my determination on the denuclearization decision [with Pyongyang’s move at an April plenary session of the Workers’ Party of Korea to end its two-track approach and focus on the economy] was the correct one.” Subtle changes in US approach and Bolton’s suggestion of easing sanctions A subtle change has also been detectable in the US’ approach. “My understanding is that the US has conveyed to the North in recent back-channel discussions that it is willing to favorably consider an end-of-war declaration, establishment of a liaison office, and greater flexibility on sanctions if there are additional denuclearization steps,” a foreign affairs source said. In that sense, public remarks from White House National Security Advisor John Bolton – considered one of the preeminent North Korea hawks – suggesting the US might consider lifting economic sanctions if results are achieved with denuclearization are noteworthy. But even with Kim’s proposal in connection with the Yongbyon nuclear facilities, the two sides have failed to bridge their differences as the US has broadened its demands to include reporting nuclear material and facilities and the missile issue. China’s neutral support without favoring Pyongyang China’s Xinhua news agency reported Xi as telling North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho on Dec. 7 of Beijing’s hopes that “positive progress can be achieved as both North Korea and the US address the other’s rational concerns” – a message that amounts to a neutral recommendation without favoring Pyongyang. Xi’s remarks about denuclearization and North Korea-US talks were not mentioned in the Rodong Sinmun newspaper’s related reporting on Dec. 9. “The situation right now is one where the US is unlikely to loosen sanctions without an additional denuclearization decision from Chairman Kim,” explained a high-ranking official in the areas of foreign affairs and national security. “Even if Chairman Kim doesn’t stand to gain very much from coming to Seoul, there doesn’t look to be any other option besides showing the courage to pay a return visit and work with President Moon to figure out a strategy for getting President Trump to make a decision,” the official suggested. A former senior official said, “Chairman Kim may feel like he’s being treated unfairly, but the situation now is one where he needs to once again act first in showing his flexibility so that President Trump can break through the opposition back home from Congress, experts and the public and say, ‘With this kind of action, we have no choice but to loosen sanctions.’” The likely reason behind Moon’s push for Kim’s Seoul visit before end of year Many analysts interpret Moon’s recent, almost immoderate insistence on Kim paying his reciprocal visit before the end of the year or early next year as based on a hopeful strategy that sees Kim’s decision on a visit in the near future as necessitating an additional denuclearization decision on his part. With South Korean news outlets publishing related articles for days on end – and even suggesting dates for the Seoul visit – Blue House Spokesperson Kim Eui-kyum declared on the afternoon of Dec. 9 that “nothing has been finalized at present,” and that the administration “does not intend to rush or press.” “We will continue to hold discussions on the specific schedule and procedure,” he said. In a Dec. 9 text message to reporters, Blue House Senior Secretary to the President for Public Relations Yoon Young-chan wrote, “We have amply communicated our message and are awaiting a decision from the North.” “No progress has yet been made in the situation, and we have nothing to announce,” he added. Among experts and current and former high-ranking officials, predictions were divided between pessimists viewing the situation as unlikely to yield a swift visit decision from Kim and optimists seeing some potential for a surprise visit decision from him following the anniversary of father and predecessor Kim Jong-il’s death on Dec. 17. Kim Jong-un has been seen as having the “strongest sense of realism” among the North Korean leadership. His decision on whether to visit Seoul in the near future appears tied to his willingness to take additional steps on denuclearization. For the North Korean leader, a “moment of truth” is at hand – one that will determine the future of the Korean Peninsula peace process. By Lee Je-hun, senior staff writer Please direct comments or questions to [english@hani.co.kr]
