케도를 지켜야 하는 이유

셀리그 해리슨. 미국 국제정책센터 선임연구원

세계의창

미국은 올해 말까지 4개 회원국으로 구성된 한반도에너지개발기구(케도)의 활동을 “종료하겠다”고 밝혔다. 이것은 “적절한 시기에 북한에 경수로를 제공하는 문제를 논의한다”는 지난달 19일 베이징 6자회담 공동성명의 약속과 정면으로 충돌한다.

한국은 11월 역사적인 회의를 위해, 미국에 단호하게 “노”라고 말해야 한다. 케도 설립협정 6조에는 회원국 합의가 없으면 다수결 투표를 규정하고 있다. 한국은 유럽연합을 끌어들여야 한다. 일본은 원한다면 케도에서 탈퇴할 수 있도록 해야 한다.

미국은 케도 자체와, 케도의 감시 아래 북한 금호지구에 건설 중인 경수로를 둘 다 없애려 하고 있다. 케도는 클린턴 행정부의 유산이다. 부시에게는 저주스러운 것이다. 그러나 한국의 이해관계는 어떤가? 한국은 이미 12억달러를 경수로에 쏟아부었다. 사업이 계속되면 추가로 10억달러에 이르는 건설계약은 한국 기업 몫이 된다.

현존 지역협력 구조를 깨고 처음부터 다시 새로운 지역적 기구를 만드는 것은 아무런 의미도 없다. 케도가 북한과 수송 및 통신 접근권을 협상하는 데는 거의 10년이 걸렸다. 케도가 무너지면 이것들도 모두 다시 논의돼야 한다. 북한과 개별적으로 쌍무합의를 하는 것은 협상도 어렵고 시간도 많이 걸린다. 케도를 북한과 완충장치로 이용함으로써 비핵화 합의의 한 부분으로서 에너지 지원을 계속하는 것이 훨씬 쉬울 것이다.

미국이 북한에 경수로를 제공하는 “적당한 시기”가 올 때까지 케도는 존속해야 하고, 경수로 계획은 보류하되 폐기해서는 안 된다. 케도를 없애는 대신 중국과 러시아를 에너지 지원 프로그램과 “적당한 시기에” 평양과의 경수로 협상에 끌어들임으로써 그것을 확장해야 한다.

2002년 12월, 한국·일본·유럽연합이 미국의 압력에 굴복해 북한행 중유 선적을 중단함으로써 북한에 제네바 기본합의를 철폐하고 핵무기 계획을 재개하는 핑계를 줬던 비극적 실수를 되풀이해서는 안 된다. 부시 행정부와 할 수 있는 하나의 가능한 타협은 2개의 경수로 대신 하나만 건설하는 것이다. 이는 클린턴 계획을 희석시키는 것으로, 부시 행정부 강경파들의 체면을 세워주는 일이다.

노무현 정부가 백악관과 대결할 의지가 없거나 일본의 지지를 얻어낼 수 없다면 최소한 제어시스템, 증기발생기, 원자로 건물과 주요 기기들을 포함해 원자로 주요 부품들의 통제권을 주장해야만 한다. 북한이 검증가능한 비핵화가 달성됐을 때 남한이 경수로 계획을 혼자서 재개할 수 있도록 미국과 합의가 이뤄져야 한다.

정동영 통일부 장관이 대북 전력 제공 제안을 통해 베이징 협상의 길을 여는 데 도움을 준 것은 올바른 결정이었다. 미국으로부터 주도권을 빼앗았으며, 더욱 유연한 협상 환경을 조성했다. 그러나 경수로 건설 문제는 전력 제공과 함께 선택권으로 열려 있어야 한다. 이 두 가지는 상호 배타적인 것이 아니다.

북한은 비핵화 과정의 한 부분으로서 하나 또는 그 이상의 경수로를 주장할 것인가, 그렇다면 어떤 수준에서 할 것인가? 이것은 11월 협상에서 6자에 의한 구체적인 유인책과 양보에 달렸다. 언제나 그랬듯이 북한은 거래를 할 준비가 돼 있다. 이것은 “북한이 핵에너지의 손실에 대한 아무런 보상 제안 없이 엄청난 노력으로 건설한 원자력 발전 산업을 포기한다는 것은 상상할 수 없다”는 9월6일 <조선중앙통신>의 성명에 명확히 나타나 있다.

셀리그 해리슨 /미 국제정책센터 선임연구원

The United States has announced that it intends to "terminate" the four-nation Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) by the end of the year. This directly conflicts with the pledges in the September 19 Beijing six-party declaration to promote regional energy cooperation with North Korea and to "discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of a light water reactor to the DPRK."

South Korea should firmly say "no" to the United States when the KEDO Board meets for an historic session in November. Article Six of the KEDO charter provides for a majority vote when a consensus cannot be reached among the member countries, and Seoul should seek to line up the European Union and, hopefully, Japan to get the United States to reconsider its position or, if it wishes, to withdraw from KEDO.

The United States is seeking to liquidate both KEDO itself and the light water reactor (LWR) project at Kumho started under its supervision. KEDO is anathema to the Bush Administration for partisan U.S. political reasons as a legacy of the Clinton Administration. But what about South Korean interests? Seoul has already spent $1.2 billion on the Kumho project, and construction contracts worth another $1 billion would go to South Korean companies when and if one or both of the projected reactors are completed.

Since regional energy help for North Korea would have to be one of the first priorities in a denuclearization agreement, it would make no sense to break up an existing structure of regional co-operation and start over from scratch to create new regional machinery. It has taken nearly a decade for KEDO to negotiate transportation and communication access rights with North Korea. These would have to be negotiated all over again if KEDO is destroyed.

Separate bilateral agreements with North Korea to implement energy aid provisions of a denuclearization agreement would be difficult and time-consuming to negotiate and could break down if bilateral political conflicts erupt. It would be much easier to carry out energy aid as part of a denuclearization agreement by using KEDO as a buffer with North Korea.

The United States is justified in insisting that the "appropriate time" for North Korea to get LWRs would only come when agreement on verifiable denuclearization has been reached. Until that time comes, KEDO should be kept in existence and the LWR project should suspended but not terminated.

In December, 2002, South Korea, Japan and the EU resisted initially when the United States demanded the cutoff of oil shipments to North Korea by KEDO but eventually bowed to U.S. pressures. This tragic mistake in effect abrogated the 1994 Agreed Framework and led to the present crisis by giving North Korea an excuse for resuming its nuclear weapons program. But this time the stakes are even higher. Unless Seoul takes a firm stand against the United States on the KEDO issue, the resolution of the LWR issue with North Korea will be much more difficult and time-consuming than necessary, and the prospects for an early denuclearization agreement with Pyongyang will be destroyed.

In December, 2002, the United States justified the abrogation of the 1994 agreement by claiming intelligence information that Pyongyang had cheated on the accord by developing a weapons-grade uranium enrichment facility. But the United States has yet to back up this accusation with evidence. Former South Korean intelligence director Ko Yong Koo reflected a growing international consensus when he told the National Assembly on February 24 that the Angibu does not believe North Korea has a weapons-grade facility because it has been unable to import the necessary components for making one.

Instead of abolishing KEDO, the logical course now would be to expand it, bringing in China and Russia to join in energy aid programs and in discussions with Pyongyang on LWRs "at the appropriate time."

One possible compromise that could be explored with the Bush administration would be to build only one LWR instead of the two envisaged in the Agreed Framework. As a dilution of the Clinton plan, this would be a face-saver for Administration hard-liners.

If the Roh Moo Hyun government is unwilling to face a showdown with the White House over the continuance of KEDO or is unable to get Japanese support for such a showdown, Seoul should, at a minimum, insist on getting custody of the reactor components that have been manufactured under KEDO contracts in South Korea and Japan, including the control panel, steam generators, reactor vessels and key instrumentation. This should be accompanied by an agreement with the U.S. that South Korea could resume the LWR project on its own when North Korea has verifiably denuclearized.

Seoul should remind the United States that liquidating KEDO would mean that North Korea would claim control of the Kumho reactor site with the costly infrastructure built under KEDO: roads, port facilities, apartments, hospitals and the containment building for the reactor. It is in the U.S. and South Korean interest to keep this infrastructure under international control.

Unification Minister Chung Dong Young made the right decision, helping to clear the way for the Beijing negotiations, with his proposal for electricity help to North Korea. This took the initiative away from the United States and created a more fluid environment for trade-offs at the recent negotiations than would otherwise have existed. But the LWR option can and should be kept open alongside the electricity offer. The two are not mutually exclusive.

Will North Korea insist on getting one or more LWRs as part of a denuclearization process, and if so, at what stage? This will depend on the concrete inducements and concessions offered by the six parties in the November negotiations. In particular, it will depend on whether the United States is ready to take big steps toward the normalization of economic and political relations, such as the removal of North Korea from the terrorist list to open the way for World Bank and Asian Development Bank infrastructure aid.

As always, North Korea is ready to bargain. This was clearly signaled in the September 6 Korean News Agency statement that "it is unimaginable for the DPRK to dismantle its nuclear power industry, built with so much effort, without getting any proposal for compensating for the loss of nuclear energy."

By Selig S. Harrison